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THe GReeN RACe, A RACe FOR JOBS
“Green race” in the media has been closely associated with the climate 
change agenda. However, economic underpinnings are not straight-
forward, as the scientific value of the very idea of a race, when applied 
to countries and not to firms, has been largely contested in the 1990’s. 
Yet the empirics have dramatically changed over the last decade, the 
scope of “tradable” activities opened to world competition enlarging. 
Consequently, the race for technology and for technology-induced pro-
ductivity gains is now primarily a race for jobs – more specifically for non-
routine and non-tradable jobs.
THe eu LeAdeRSHiP iN THe WiNd ANd PHOTOVOLTAiC SeCTORS
Green technologies are expected to provide the EU with a means to make 
up for exhausted growth potential, while enabling the fast transition 
toward a low-carbon society. No breakthrough technologies are expected 
in the renewable energies (REN) sectors studied – namely wind and pho-
tovoltaic (PV) – in short term though. Labour and sectoral (value added) 
perspectives are much more certain and supportive of REN innovation 
and deployment. The majority of value added and jobs are located in the 
EU, with so far limited entry from foreign firms into significant segments 
of the chains. The EU has a clear leadership of the wind energy sector, and 
the majority of business opportunities created worldwide benefit EU PV 
firms.
HYPeRCOMPeTiTiON AS THe dOMiNANT GLOBALiSATiON NARRATiVe? 
Even though the current competition structure in wind and PV energy 
value chains is beneficial to EU firms, this situation might not be stable 
over time. Hypercompetition could become the dominant narrative in 
the wind value chain (offshore), and could turn out to be oligopolistic 
and conventional in the PV sector, to the detriment of EU firms prevented 
from accessing markets such as China. In both sectors, public policies are 
at stake: in the EU, through sustained incentives; and globally through 
the negotiation of “sustainable energy trade agreements”. w
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1. Why a “muddle” over 
the greeN race? 
1.1. The green race at country 
level: a political obsession
While it is not known exactly who first coined the 
term “green race”, occurrence in the media has 
been closely associated with the climate change 
global agenda. Two weeks before the Rio Earth 
Summit took place (in June 1992), the “green 
race” was already on, opposing at that time the US 
and Japan, which was deemed “ten years ahead” 
in “green technology”1. A few months before the 
Kyoto conference on climate change (COP 3 – 
December 1997), Japan “raised the stakes in the 
race to develop cleaner and more frugal vehicles”, 
taking “pole position in green race”2. Still, the peak 
in the use of the term “green race” in the media 
occurred in 2009, at a time when green stimulus 
packages were being enacted to cope with the 
recession, and when the widely publicised Copen-
hagen climate change conference (COP15) was just 
a few weeks away (figure 1). 
For those slower countries and industries that 
would have missed the early 1992 start between the 
US and Japan, catch-up opportunities have come 
along successively, with new “starts” trumpeted 
here and there. Hence The Australian announced 
1. Ramon Isberto, “Earth Summit: Green Race Between US 
and Japan?”, Inter Press Service Global Information Net-
work, 1 June 1992. This is the first occurrence of “green 
race” in the media according to the Dow Jones Factiva 
database we have used. 
2. Haig Simonian, “Honda takes pole position in green 
race”, Financial Times, 21 October 1997.
in July 1999 that the “race is now on” 3, and it was 
on again when Obama “fired the starting gun” in 
his January 2009 speech on renewable energy, ac-
cording to The Times4. The “green race is on” has 
been a sort of mantra in UK and US newspapers 
ever since5. 
3. “The green race is now on”, The Australian, 29 July 1999.
4. Camilla Cavendish, “Obama surges ahead in the race 
to be green; The President’s bold speech on renewable 
energy has thrown down the gauntlet to the rest of the 
world’s leaders”, The Times, 6 February 2009.
5. “Green race is on; China is sprinting toward its goal of 
cleaner energy while the U.S. is taking baby steps”, Las 
Vegas Sun, 8 July 2009. “U.S., China can bridge emis-
sions gap absent U.N. deal – CEOs”, Greenwire, 14 Octo-
ber 2009. “India Inc discussion focuses on Vision 2050: 
the new agenda for business”, India Infoline News Ser-
vice, 5 February 2010. “NRTEE Creates New G8 Low-
Carbon Performance Index”, Marketwire, 20 May 2010. 
“WBCSD Annual Council Meeting in China Focuses 
Global Sustainable Development on ‘Green Race’”, PR 
Newswire, 2 November 2010. “CO2-Problem ist technisch 
lösbar; Siemens-Vorstandsmitglied Barbara Kux über 
die Bekämpfung des Klimawandels”, interview: Bendikt 
Vogel, Berlin, Basler Zeitung, 3 December 2010.
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
figure 1. Incidence of “green race” in newspaper titles or 
content (2001-2010)
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The emergence of green race rhetoric in the 
1990s was accompanied by heated debates among 
economists on the scientific value of the very idea 
of a race, when applied, as was the case at the 
time, to countries and not to firms. Against the 
view of then-president Bill Clinton that each na-
tion is “like a big corporation competing in the 
global marketplace”6, supported by his Council of 
Economic Advisors7, some outstanding economists 
such as Paul Krugman recalled some basic eco-
nomics to explain countries’ growth and employ-
ment records, dismissing the idea of any race be-
tween countries. “[C]ountries do not compete with 
each other the way corporations do”, he wrote in his 
essay “Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession”8. 
“If the European economy does well, it need not be at 
US expense (…) While competitive problems could 
arise in principle, as a practical, empirical matter 
the major nations of the world are not to any sig-
nificant degree in economic competition with each 
other. Of course, there is always a rivalry for status 
and power – countries that grow faster will see their 
political rank rise”. The race between the US and 
Japan was therefore a political race for power and 
status. China overcoming Japan slightly changes 
the picture yet. 
1.2. The disputed gains 
from international trade 
Over the last 10 years, the empirics have dramati-
cally changed. “[R]ecently we crossed an important 
watershed”, Krugman wrote in December 2007 in 
a New York Times Op-Ed9, “we now import more 
manufactured goods from the third world than from 
other advanced economies. That is, a majority of our 
industrial trade is now with countries that are much 
poorer than we are and that pay their workers much 
lower wages. (…) The highly educated workers who 
clearly benefit from growing trade with third-world 
economies are a minority, greatly outnumbered by 
those who probably lose”. Krugman concluded: 
“[T]hose who are worried about trade have a point, 
and deserve some respect”. 
Two intertwined reasons can be pointed out, 
both of which relate to the countries currently 
“racing” – the BASICs (Brazil, South Africa, India 
6. Quoted by Krugman, P. (1994), “Competitiveness: A 
Dangerous Obsession”, Foreign Affairs, March/April: 
28-44.
7. See the popular book by its Chair: Laura D’Andrea 
Tyson (1992), Who’s Bashing Whom: Trade Conflict in 
High-Technology Industries, Institute for International 
Economics, Washington, DC. 
8. See note 6.
9. Krugman, P. (2007) “Trouble With Trade”, New York 
Times, December 28, 2007.
and China), and no longer the Quad countries 
(the United States, the European Union, Canada 
and Japan). First, international trade, which to-
day represents an even greater share of national 
GDP than in the 1990s, no longer covers products 
but rather tasks, enlarging the scope of “tradable” 
activities opened to world competition10. Second-
ly, it increasingly occurs between high-wage and 
low-wage countries in both service sectors (India) 
and manufacturing sectors (China), two features 
that were far less salient 20 years ago. As a conse-
quence, the “race” propelled by globalisation may 
become detrimental to the leading country as long 
as the catching-up process entails a transfer of 
wealth from the leading to the catching-up coun-
try through outsourcing, imitation and innovation. 
This was formalised in a highly controversial pa-
per by another Nobel Prize winner. In 2004, Paul 
Samuelson sketched out the possible consequenc-
es of China catching up with the US in the very sec-
tor where the US enjoyed a comparative advantage 
– in other words, where it was leading the race. In 
his paper, this was supposed to happen thanks to 
technical innovation (“imitation or home ingenu-
ity”) and outsourcing. “What does [the] arithmetic 
tell us about realistic U.S. long-run effects from such 
outsourcings? The new […] productivities [levels] 
imply that, this invention abroad that gives to China 
some of the comparative advantage that had be-
longed to the United States can induce for the United 
States permanent lost per capita real income”11.
Forecasts on future investments in clean energy 
technology (figure 2) and anticipated trends in 
installed renewable energy capacity between the 
EU27, China and the US (figure 3) provide possible 
illustrations of the “Samuelson syndrome”: real 
wages in the sector concerned and potential over-
all real GDP could decline should China continue 
to catch up in green technologies and to grasp an 
ever wider share of the value added in the supply 
chain. The problem there is not that renewable 
technologies present salient features that firms 
and countries must consider while racing, but 
basically that China and India tend to specialise 
in these very sectors or tasks where, historically, 
Quad countries enjoyed undisputed comparative 
advantages when trading with one another. In 
short, the EU could be in trouble if what happened 
between China and Japan on PV cells over the last 
10. See Grossman, Gene and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg 
(2006): “Trade in Tasks: A Simple Theory of Offshoring”, 
NBER Working Paper No. 12721.
11. Samuelson, P. (2004) “Where Ricardo and Mill Rebut 
and Confirm Arguments of Mainstream Economists 
Supporting Globalization”, The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, vol. 18, n° 3 (Summer, 2004): 135-146.
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five years is generalised to larger segments of key 
renewable supply chains. 
Relative productivity gains across countries 
induced by different innovation and technical 
change patterns may therefore occur without 
mutual benefits for all trading countries. Grow-
ing trade with major emerging countries such as 
China (the Krugman 2007 argument above) could 
hurt not only OECD manufacturing sector work-
ers, but also the tradable services labour force, 
with technological progress spurring offshoring12 
in the form of (international) “trade in tasks”. 
Consequently, the race for technology and for 
technology-induced productivity gains is now pri-
marily a race for jobs – and more specifically, for 
non-routine and non-tradable jobs associated to 
the so-called green new tech.
In its macro dimension, the “green race” unfolds 
in the EU in a quite specific context. Let’s recall first 
that capital accumulation and innovation are the 
two main engines of growth. Following Aghion and 
Durlauf (2006)13, let’s further recall that the EU – 
contrary to the US – resorted mostly to capital ac-
cumulation, imitation or adaption of technological 
12. Offshoring is the relocation of production sites (jobs) 
to foreign countries to take advantage of lower (labour) 
input costs. This phenomenon is often mislabelled as 
“outsourcing”, a term that refers to the organisational 
structure of the firm instead (i.e. the choice of what 
selection of tasks are to be performed outside the firm); 
outsourcing may or may not involve the relocation of 
jobs to a foreign country.
13. Aghion, Ph., and Durlauf, S. (2007) “From Growth 
Theory to Policy Design”, mimeo.
innovations made elsewhere between 1945 and the 
1970s. “In 1945, Europe’s stock of physical capital had 
been largely destroyed and its technological knowl-
edge as reflected by its average level of per capita GDP 
was far behind per capita GDP in the US. So, what it 
would take to grow at that time, was for Europe to 
accumulate capital and to imitate or adapt techno-
logical innovations made elsewhere. And this is what 
Europe did quite successfully during the ”trente glo-
rieuses”, with the support of economic institutions and 
policies that were adapted to those goals” Aghion and 
Durlauf emphasize. “However, by the late 1980s Eu-
rope had largely caught up with the world technology 
frontier in terms of its capital labor ratio and also in 
terms of its per capita GDP level. This in turn implied 
that Europe had largely exhausted capital accumula-
tion and technological imitation as its main sources 
of growth, and had to turn to an alternative source, 
namely innovation”14. Green technologies provide 
the EU with a means to make up for exhausted 
growth potential generated by factor accumulation 
and stagnating capital-labor ratio, while enabling 
the fast transition toward a low-carbon society. 
1.3. Two narratives 
of globalisation
Against this backdrop, the main counter-argu-
ments in defence of globalisation emphasise 
the classical gains from trade, and the rather 
unchanged distribution of value added along 
14. Ibid.
figure 2. Investment in clean energy technology figure 3. Installed renewable capacity
Source: IDDRI based on Pew Research Center.Source: IDDRI based on PewResearch Center.
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These two Charts are more interesting for what they reveal than for what they show. Computed on the basis of Pew Research Center forecasts, they reveal the fear of the US 
lagging behind China. Forecasts by European-based renewables associations such as European Wind Energy Association and European Photovoltaic Industry Association give 
a far less dramatic upsurge in China’s installed renewable capacities until 2020.
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global value chains between rich and poor coun-
tries. The most widespread example, flagged by 
WTO director Pascal Lamy to argue for freer trade, 
is the iPod, the majority of whose added-value 
accrues to US firms even though the product is 
labelled “made in China”. Mr. Lamy stressed that if 
trade statistics were adjusted to reflect the actual 
value contributed to a product by different coun-
tries, the size of the US trade deficit with China – 
$226.88 billion, according to US figures – would be 
halved. He argued that political tension over trade 
deficits is therefore probably higher than it should 
be. On job aspects, some authors also stress that 
increased competition through offshoring with 
low-wage countries does not change the speciali-
sation pattern of OECD countries towards “non-
routine” tasks, which began in the mid-1970s, 
well before such countries emerged in the global 
economy15. 
Arguments and counter-arguments over the 
originality of the current high-tech race unleashed 
by globalisation and the rising economic power of 
emerging countries delineate two distinct narra-
tives of globalisation. 
The first narrative contends that the current 
wave of globalisation is no different from the pre-
vious one, enabling any country to be better off 
thanks to comparative advantage efficiency gains. 
Innovation lies at the heart of growth in firms and 
countries. It is spread across countries thanks to 
international trade and foreign direct investments 
(FDI) and, if properly secured through intellectual 
property rights (IPR), rewards the innovative firm 
or country with higher productivity levels than 
the followers. At first sight, the rationale for the 
green race at country level remains more political 
(relative power mirroring relative growth rate) 
than economic. In economic terms, basically only 
relative growth gains are at stake. From a US or 
OECD perspective, the offshoring of part of the 
supply chain for high-tech products occurs to the 
benefit of such countries, whose firms continue 
to reap profits in their national territories in the 
15. In their paper, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (see 
footnote 10) divided labour input into “routine tasks” 
requiring the methodical repetition of procedures 
that can be well-described by a set of rules, and “non-
routine” tasks requiring visual and motor processing that 
cannot easily be described by rules. The two categories 
cut across skill levels. It was expected that it would be 
easier for a firm to offshore routine tasks than non-
routine tasks, independent of the skill level of the job. 
What they found is that the number of routine tasks 
has been falling since 1970, while that of non-routine 
tasks has been rising, with acceleration in each case in 
recent years. What this means is that relatively more US 
workers are doing jobs that cannot be well-described by 
mechanical rules, specialising in those tasks that cannot 
be performed remotely. 
most valuable segments of the chain (see the iPod 
story). Deindustrialisation is one aspect of this 
narrative: a temporary stage of the development 
of rich countries, following on from the temporary 
stage of industrialisation. Ultimately, deindustri-
alisation is good news as long as it allows firms 
to (re)locate most of the value added in the home 
country and generate some surpluses for export to 
balance trade16. Let us call this narrative “conven-
tional competition”. 
The second narrative emphasises the asymmet-
ric gains and losses induced by globalisation for 
leaders and followers. It stresses that global com-
petition spurs incremental innovation and imita-
tion, allowing an ever wider range of countries 
and firms to access the best available technology 
through declining patent costs. In a way, globali-
sation rewards the follower more than the leader. 
This second narrative suggests that it encourages 
imitation, not innovation,. Distributive impacts 
will appear all the more costly to the leader as the 
productivity gains induced by technological in-
novation decline over time and promptly vanish 
because of imitation and/or financial acquisition 
of national companies by foreign firms and state-
owned enterprises (SOEs). Additionally, this nar-
rative suggests, OECD countries may be unable 
to cope with displaced workers and the victims of 
trade – through “social safety nets” for instance, 
this narrative recalls that historically, the more 
open economies have had the biggest governments 
to cope with trade-induced shocks17 – because of 
their fiscal basis being siphoned by tax avoidance, 
fiscal competition and bail-out plans, which are 
all the result of unleashed globalisation forces18. 
Ultimately, deindustrialisation and offshoring are 
not only a dent in the social contract, but the very 
reason real GDP will eventually decline because 
of the incapacity of such countries and firms to 
drive the supply-chain and benefit from the ad-
ditional value-added gains associated with the 
driving/leading position. Let us call this narrative 
“hypercompetition”.
16. See for instance Julia Cagé, “Vive la désindustrialisation”, 
La Tribune, 01/03/2011, http://www.latribune.
f r / o p i n i o n s / 2 0110 3 01 t r i b 0 0 0 6 0 4 97 2 / v i ve - l a -
desindustrialisation-.html
17. Rodrik, D. (1998), “Why Do More Economies Have 
Bigger Governments?”, Journal of Political Economy, 
106(5), October. 
18. Rodrik, D. (2011), The Globalization Paradox: Democracy 
and the Future of the World Economy, W.W Norton, New 
York and London. 
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2. the first-mover advaNtages 
aNd disadvaNtages
The main academic contributions on the rationale 
for moving first and racing ahead stem from 
management reviews such as the Strategic Manage-
ment Journal and The Journal of Product Innova-
tion Management or The Journal of Marketing. 
We have found almost nothing in globalisation 
and trade economic reviews, probably because 
these tend to focus more on countries than on 
firms, with a bias for comparative static analysis 
leaving very little room for innovation processes, 
considered as exogenous or proxied with R&D and 
education expenses. Below we present a concep-
tual framework of first (or “early”) mover advan-
tages and disadvantages, established on the basis 
of the most salient contributions to the aforemen-
tioned marketing and management reviews. 
2.1. A conceptual framework
In their seminal work and reference paper, 
Lieberman and Montgomery identify three 
primary sources from which first-mover advan-
tages (FMAs)19 arise. 
1) Technological leadership, enabling firms to 
reap advantages derived i) from the “learning” or 
“experience” curve, where costs fall with cumula-
tive output (the classical economies of scale ar-
gument), and ii) success in patent or R&D races, 
where advances in product or process technology 
are a function of R&D expenditure (the classical 
endogenous growth theory argument). 
2) Pre-emption of scarce assets. Here, the first-
mover gains advantage by controlling assets that 
already exist, rather than those created by the firm 
through the development of new technologies. 
Such assets may be physical resources or other 
process inputs (e.g. rare earths). Alternatively, the 
assets may relate to positioning in “space”, includ-
ing geographical space, product space, shelf space 
and so on. 
3) Switching costs and buyer choice under uncer-
tainty. In this case, late entrants must invest extra 
resources to attract customers away from the first-
mover firm. Switching costs may stem from initial 
transaction costs or investment that the buyer 
makes in adapting to the seller’s product. They 
may also arise due to supplier-specific learning by 
the buyer; or they may be intentionally created by 
the seller. A related strand of literature deals with 
the imperfect information of buyers regarding 
19. Lieberman, M.B., and Montgomery, D.B. (1988), “First-
Mover Advantages”, Strategic Management Journal, 9: 
41-58.
product quality. In such a context, buyers may 
rationally stick with the first brand and/or tech-
nology they encounter that perform the task sat-
isfactorily. Psychology literature suggests that the 
first product introduced receives disproportionate 
attention in the consumer’s mind. 
Frynas, Mellahi and Pigman (2006) add a fourth 
source of first-mover advantages, namely firm-
specific political resources20. Acquiring, exploit-
ing and sustaining firm-specific political resources 
in international business can lead to significant 
FMAs in the international marketplace, they ar-
gue, drawing examples from Shell-BP in Nigeria, 
Volkswagen in China, and Lockheed Martin in 
Russia. Nevertheless, they stress that the causal re-
lationship between political resources and FMAs is 
a complex one. Political resources may indeed lead 
to early market entry, but firms can also obtain 
considerable political resources by being the first 
to market. Neither can FMAs be taken for granted.
All these authors acknowledge that the mecha-
nisms that benefit the first-mover may be counter-
balanced by various disadvantages that are in ef-
fect advantages enjoyed by late-mover firms. 
1) Late-movers may benefit from the ability to 
free-ride on a pioneering firm’s investments in a 
number of areas including R&D, buyer education, 
and infrastructure development. 
2) Late-movers can gain an edge through the 
resolution of market or technological uncertainty 
(and/or take advantage of the first-mover’s mis-
takes). Entry into an uncertain market entails a 
high degree of risk. Early entry may be more at-
tractive when the firm can influence the way this 
uncertainty is resolved – for example, the firm 
may be able to set industry standards in its favour. 
Interestingly, in many new product markets, un-
certainty is resolved through the emergence of a 
“dominant design” (e.g. Ford T and DC-3 in the au-
tomotive and aircraft industries). After the emer-
gence of such a design, competition often shifts to 
price; thereby giving greater advantages to firms 
possessing skills in low-cost manufacturing. The 
case of the PV sector, in which China overcame Ja-
pan on the world export market within five years, 
suggests that this kind of late-mover advantage is 
driven by standardisation and price competition 
(figure 4). 3) A third late-mover advantage – or 
first-mover disadvantage – consists in technologi-
cal discontinuities that provide “gateways” for new 
entry (steam locomotive manufacturers failing to 
respond to the invention of diesel, for instance). 
20. Frynas, J.G., Mellahi, K., and Pigman, G.A. (2006), 
“First-Mover Advantages in International Business and 
Firm-Specific Political Resources”, Strategic Management 
Journal, 27: 321-345.
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Customer needs are dynamic, creating opportuni-
ties for later entrants unless the first-mover is alert 
and able to respond. 
4) In the same vein, first-mover vulnerability 
is often enhanced by incumbent inertia, the firm 
being locked into a specific set of fixed assets, or 
reluctant to cannibalise existing product lines; for 
fear that the firm may become organisationally 
inflexible. 
First-mover advantages and disadvantages are 
summarised in Table 1. 
The debate concerning the green race points 
primarily to the first line of Table 1 (technologi-
cal leadership) and to a lesser extent to the sec-
ond (scarce assets) and the fourth (captive local 
markets; public procurement targeted at national 
firms, etc.). The green race so far often seems to 
be a race for (public) spending such as the one 
echoed by discussions on the “best” or “more am-
bitious” green recovery package21. What the Ta-
ble also shows is that it is not necessary to lead 
the technology race in order to reap the profits. 
For instance, one might assume that competitive 
advantages are not sustainable if an obvious re-
source is easy to imitate, but this assumption may 
be wrong if other, less obvious, resources (access 
21. See, for instance, UNEP (2009) “Rethinking the 
Economic Recovery: A Global Green New Deal”, Report 
by Edward Barbier for UNEP Economics and Trade, 
Division of Technology, Industry and Economics, and 
HSBC (2009), “Building a green recovery”, Caring for 
Climate Series, UN Global Compact.
to customers, for instance) are difficult to imitate. 
The difficulty of imitating some key resources 
makes early-mover competitive advantages sus-
tainable despite the fact that the product itself is 
easily imitated22. What the Table eventually recalls 
is that it may sometimes be counterproductive to 
lead, in comparison with a late-mover position.
22. This is the case of the money market mutual fund 
industry in particular, see Makadok, R. (1998), “Can 
First-Mover and Early-Mover Advantages Be Sustained 
in an Industry with Low Barriers to Entry/Imitation?”, 
Strategic Management Journal, 19(7): 683-696.
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figure 4. PV module shipments (“market”) and installations (“production”), 2000-2010 (%)
table 1. First-mover advantages and disadvantages
First-mover advantages First-mover disadvantages
Technological leadership
i) learning or experience curve 
(costs fall with cumulative output)
ii) patent and R&D
Free riding on pioneering firms’ 
investments
Technological discontinuities that 
provide “gateways” for new entry
Pre-emption of scarce assets
i) physical resources, process 
inputs
ii) positioning in “space”
Incumbent inertia
Switching costs and buyer choices 
under uncertainty
Resolution of market or 
technological uncertainty by 
late-movers
Firm-specific political resources Firm-specific political resources 
exist for late-movers as well
With only small quantities (less than 1 GW annually) of modules shipped and installed during the years 2000-2003, local markets worldwide were supplied by local produc-
tion. From 2004 onwards, an increasing number of Japanese modules were imported to the EU in order to supply its rapidly growing market. The same phenomenon happened 
with Chinese modules, reaching more than 50% of the global PV module production in 2010, against less than 15% in 2006.
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2.2. Empirical results on 
first-mover advantages: 
a literature review
Empirical results confirm the balanced view given 
by Table 1, while conveying interesting insights 
concerning the various meanings of innovation. 
Measuring innovation and innovativeness requires 
carefully defining these constructs. Definitions 
actually abound, differing across the marketing, 
engineering, and new product development disci-
plines. What the literature in all these strands 
shows is that innovation processes have been iden-
tified for not only “radical”, “incremental”, “really 
new”, “discontinuous” and “imitative” innovations, 
but also “architectural”, “modular”, “improving”, 
and “evolutionary” innovations. Garcia and Calan-
tone propose a typology basically distinguishing 
“radical”, “really new”, “discontinuous”, “incre-
mental” and “imitative” innovations23. In most 
empirical literature, a further simplification is 
made in this typology, with a basic distinction 
between “really new” and “incrementally” new 
product-markets to start with. 
Two empirical works deserve mention in this 
respect. The first one answers the following 
question: does the first entrant in a new market 
struggle to survive, or do first-mover advantages 
provide protection from outright failure? Min, 
Kalwani and Robinson identified 264 new indus-
trial product-markets, emerging in the US econo-
my from 1960 to 1995, for which they compared 
survival risks in markets that were launched with a 
really new product with those that were launched 
with an incremental innovation. What they found 
is that when a pioneer starts up a new market with 
a really new product, it can be a major challenge 
to survive. In contrast, in markets launched by an 
incremental innovation, market pioneer survival 
risks are much lower, meaning that the likelihood 
of survival is higher. In particular, the authors 
stress that early followers have the same survival 
risk across both types of markets. Overall, in mar-
kets launched by a really new product, the first 
to market is often the first to fail. In contrast, in 
markets launched by an incremental innovation, 
first-mover advantages protect the pioneer from 
outright failure24. 
23. Which pertain both to the product (technology) and its 
marketing, see Garcia, R., and Calantone, R. (2002), “A 
critical look at technological innovation typology and 
innovativeness terminology: a literature review”, The 
Journal of Product Innovation Management 19: 110-132.
24. Min, S., Kalwani, M.U., and Robinson, W.T. (2006), 
“Market Pioneer and Early Follower Survival Risks: A 
Contingency Analysis of Really New Versus Incrementally 
New Product-Markets”, Journal of Marketing 70: 15-33.
From a century-long perspective, Agarwal and 
Gort examine historical changes in the US mar-
ket for the duration of the interval between the 
commercial introduction of a new product and 
the time when entry by later competitors begins. 
Interestingly, they recall that investment in inno-
vation is driven by expectations of transitory mo-
nopoly returns, protected either by patents or by 
developing innovations and getting to the market 
first. At the turn of the 20th century, competing 
firms in the infant phonograph record industry, 
for instance, relied heavily on secrets to protect 
their property rights. “Even patenting a device was 
considered tantamount to advertising it”25, they re-
mind us. Whether or not such a strategy would be 
equally effective in the same industry today is the 
question they ask. They collected data for 46 major 
product innovations and discovered that the aver-
age time span between the commercial introduc-
tion of a new product and late competitor entry 
was almost 33 years at the turn of the 20th century 
and declined to 3.4 years for innovations in the 
period1967-1986. 
Why has the rate of initial competitive entry 
into new markets been rising steadily and rapidly 
over the last century, pointing to a weakening of 
entry barriers on net balance? They attribute this 
outcome largely to (a) the increased mobility of 
skilled labour; (b) improvements in communica-
tions and, as a consequence, a more rapid diffu-
sion of technical information; (c) an increase in 
the number of potential entrants; and (d) growth 
in the absolute size of markets. They conclude that 
these results do not necessarily imply a reduction 
in the incentive to innovate, but are consistent 
with one possible effect of the observed trends: 
that firms may increase their reliance on patenting 
rather than trade secrets. 
This conclusion was already suggested by other 
scholars who observed that the increase in patent-
ing in the US as from the 1980s had been driven 
by changes in the management of innovation, in-
volving a shift to more applied activities, favour-
ing “incremental” innovation rather than techno-
logical revolution protected by trade secrets26. The 
shift towards environmental patenting seems to be 
a common feature of both early-mover and late-
mover emerging countries in the environmental 
sector industry. Globally, some 215 000 green tech-
nology patent applications were filed worldwide 
over the period 1998-2008, including some 22 000 
in developing countries, out of which about 7 400 
25. See footnote above.
26. Kortum, S., and Lerner, J. (1997), “Stronger protection 
or technological revolution: What is behind the recent 
surge in patenting?”, NBER working paper 6204.
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were actually owned by developing country resi-
dents, according to a study commissioned by EU 
DG Trade27. When the last four years of the period 
are compared to the first four years, the global pat-
ent count increased by 120%, but by nearly 550% 
in developing countries. Solar energy and fuel cell 
patents account for 80% of the count and for most 
of the growth as well, followed by wind energy 
as a distant third. In 1998, 1 in 20 patents for the 
relevant technologies was protected in a develop-
ing country; in 2008 it was 1 in 5. Competition and 
marginal (or incremental) innovation patenting 
together explain why intellectual property right 
(IPR) protection does not seem to be a decisive 
leading factor (or late-mover obstacle) for key re-
newables when compared with learning and ex-
perience curves (scale returns) and firm-specific 
political resources (Table 2).  
It is sometimes claimed that the exclusive owner-
ship rights that patents bestow on their holders cre-
ate a monopolistic market structure and drive up 
the price of the goods that embody these innovative 
technologies, thereby making them less affordable 
for low-income developing countries. The DG Trade-
commissioned study on IPR provides a picture of the 
distribution of patent rights by country of residence 
of the patent holder, which can be considered as a 
good means of gauging the strength of monopolistic 
powers in the market. The study shows that no sin-
gle nationality actually dominates the market for a 
particular IPR-protected technology.
Even if they face patent issues in entering the 
field as producers, late-movers are likely to be able 
27. Copenhagen Economics A/S and the IPR Company APS 
(2009), “IPR as a Barrier to Transfer of Climate Change 
Technology”, report commissioned by the European 
Commission (DG Trade), 19 January 2009.
to obtain licences on reasonable terms because of 
the large number of firms in the industry, Barton 
(2007) points out. The possibility of entry is dem-
onstrated by Tata-BP Solar (India), based on a joint 
venture, and Suntech (China), based on a combi-
nation of its own technologies and of purchases of 
developed world firms (Barton, 2007).
2.3. The sustainability of 
first-mover advantages
Understanding the dynamics of first-mover advan-
tages and disadvantages (encapsulated in Table 1) 
is crucial to determining the likelihood that EU 
countries and firms will sustain an edge in the near 
future over their rivals or be caught up in specific 
market segments. Heated debates abound in the 
FMA literature as to whether the current phase of 
globalisation inexorably makes FMAs more and 
more temporary, while according to the opposite 
view, sustainability still prevails and is attainable 
by first-mover countries or firms, at least under 
specific conditions. 
Authors like D’Aveni stress that we have entered 
an age of “hypercompetition”28 and “temporary 
advantages”29, where hypercompetition is defined 
as “an environment of fierce competition leading to 
unsustainable advantage or the decline in the sus-
tainability of advantage”. How organisations can 
successfully compete, evolve, and survive when 
firm-specific advantages are not sustainable or 
28. D’Aveni, R.A., 1994, Hypercompetition: Managing the 
Dynamics of Strategic Maneuvering, Free Press: New 
York.
29. D’Aveni, R.A., Dagnino, G.B., and Smith, K.G (2010), “The 
Age of Temporary Advantage”, Strategic Management 
Journal, 31: 1371-1385.
table 2. Intellectual property implications: PV, biofuel, and wind
techNology pv biofuel WiNd
IP access limitations on current 
market for energy (For reducing 
emissions or participating in CDM)
Few concerns over IP Essentially no concerns over IP
Possible concerns over IP, but likely 
to involve at most a small royalty
Major developing country concerns 
in future market for energy
Possible difficulties in obtaining 
advanced IP-protected technologies
Possible barriers or delays in 
obtaining cellulosic technologies
Possible risk of anti-competitive 
behaviour given concentration of 
industry
IP access limitations on entering 
the industry as a producer of key 
components or products
Possible barriers or delays in 
obtaining or creating the highest 
quality production systems
Possible concerns over access 
to new enzymes and conversion 
organisms – but at most a royalty 
issue
Possible difficulty in obtaining most 
advanced technologies
Most important overall concerns 
in area
Access to government-funded 
technologies, Standards
Global trade barriers in the sugar 
/ ethanol / fuel context. Access to 
government-funded technologies, 
Standards
Access to government-funded 
technologies, Plausible anti-
competitive behaviour, Standards
Source: Barton, J.H. (2007), “Intellectual Property and Access to Clean Energy Technologies in Developing Countries. An Analysis of Solar Photovoltaic, Biofuel and Wind 
Technologies”, Trade and Sustainable Energies Series, Issue Paper 2, ICSTD, Geneva, p. 18.
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enduring, but more temporary in nature, is the 
question they raise. Such conditions, they argue, 
may exist due to fast-paced competitive actions 
and counter-responses among rivals, or where 
frequent endogenous and exogenous competence-
destroying disruptions and discontinuities make 
sustaining one’s advantage impossible.
Empirically, Thomas (1996)30 and Thomas and 
D’Aveni (2009)31 contend that 20th-century indus-
tries based on sustainable oligopolies were being 
replaced by industries that had become hypercom-
petitive. Recalling Schumpeter’s theory of com-
petitive behaviour, according to which competitive 
advantage will become increasingly more difficult 
to sustain in a wide range of industries, Wiggins 
and Ruefli (2005) find support for the argument 
that over time, competitive advantage has become 
significantly harder to sustain and, further, that 
the phenomenon is limited neither to high-tech-
nology industries nor to manufacturing industries, 
but is seen across a broad range of industries. They 
also find evidence that sustained competitive ad-
vantage is increasingly a matter not of a single ad-
vantage maintained over time, but more a matter 
of concatenating over time a sequence of advan-
tages32. For these authors, the two key sustainable 
advantage models (Porter’s five forces model and 
the resource-based view of the firm) are obsolete 
(Box 1). Distinguishing temporary advantages 
from sustainable advantages is an empirical mat-
ter, however, just as much as the distinction be-
tween the two globalisation narratives upon which 
they depend (Table 3).
While Table 1 lists the circumstances under 
which an industry or firm may emerge in a given 
country and capture a share of the home market, 
Table 3 circumscribes the factors determining 
whether the profits of such a firm are sustainable 
or disappear over time. We provide some empirics 
in the following sections through the analysis of 
FMAs and competition structure in the wind and 
PV supply chains. 
30. Thomas, L.G., (1996), “The two faces of competition: 
dynamic resourcefulness and the hypercompetitive 
shift”, Organization Science 7: 221–242.
31. Thomas, L.G., D’Aveni, R.A., (2009), “The changing 
nature of competition in the U.S. manufacturing sector, 
1950 to 2002”, Strategic Organization 7(4): 387–431.
32. Robert R. Wiggins and Timothy W. Ruefli (2005) 
“Schumpeter’s Ghost: Is Hypercompetition Making the 
Best of Times Shorter?”, Strategic Management Journal, 
Vol. 26, No. 10, pp. 887-911.
box 1. are sustainable first-mover advantages 
still sustainable?
Porter’s (1980)1 five forces model suggests that firms can sustain 
advantages by the selection of industries and the way they position 
themselves within industries. This model is supported by substantial 
but somewhat dated research on the structure-conduct performance 
paradigm from industrial organisation economics. Specifically, Porter 
suggests that firms seek to position themselves in industries with high 
entry barriers, weak suppliers and buyers, few threats from substitutes, 
and limited rivalry.
The resource-based view conceives of firms as collections of 
resources (Penrose, 1959)2. Barney (1991)3 formalised the framework 
for explaining how a firm’s resources can be used as a source of sus-
tainable competitive advantage. His framework is based on two fun-
damental assumptions: (1) firms within an industry are heterogene-
ous in the resources they control, and (2) these resources may not be 
perfectly mobile across firms (Barney, 1991). With these assumptions, 
Barney argues that markets for resources are imperfect and, therefore, 
a firm can achieve sustainable competitive advantage by acquiring 
or developing resources that are valuable, unique, non-tradable, rare, 
non-substituTable, or non-imiTable. But what does this model say about 
sustainability when factor markets continue to move towards perfection 
or towards constant disruption through innovation or rivalry? Or what if 
there are dramatic or even constant changes in resource value, unique-
ness, tradability, and imitability?
Source: D’Aveni, R.A., Dagnino, G.B., and Smith, K.G (2010), “The Age of Temporary Advan-
tage”, Strategic Management Journal, 31: 1371-1385.
1. Porter, M., (1980), Competitive Strategy, Free Press: New York.
2. Penrose, E.T., (1959), The Theory of the Growth of the Firm. 
John Wiley & Sons: New York.
3. Barney, J.B., (1991), “Firm resources and sustained competitive 
advantage”, Journal of Management 17(1): 99–120.
Table 3. The two globalisation narratives revisited in the 
light of first-mover advantages
sustainable fmas globalisation 
potential changes
temporary fmas
High entry barriers 
Weak suppliers and 
buyers 
Few threats from 
substitutes 
Limited rivalry
Firm-specific 
resources are:
non-tradable
non-substituTable
or non-imiTable
More supply chain 
segments in 
competition
Low labour cost 
competitors 
Incremental 
innovation (lower 
margins in wider 
markets) 
Low entry barriers 
(contestable 
markets)
Strong suppliers or 
buyers
Substitutes
Rivalry
Firm specific 
resources are:
tradable
substituTable
or imiTable
Globalisation 
narrative: conventional 
competition
Globalisation 
narrative:
hypercompetition
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3. coNveNtioNal competitioN: 
the eu WiNd eNergy sector
3.1. Facts and figures: the EU, 
an early mover and still leader 
According to the European Wind Energy Associa-
tion (EWEA), cumulative wind energy installations 
in the EU in 2010 reached 84.1 GW (including 1.6 
GW offshore by the end of 2009). This is twice as 
much as China’s global wind power capacity (42.2 
GW) and that of the US (40.2 GW), even though 
China’s new installations (off-grid included, which 
amounts to as much as 30% of installed capacities 
according to some sources) are increasing sharply. 
The breakdown of annual market share among 
top wind turbine manufacturers reflects both the 
EU leadership in this field and the massive entry 
of emerging country firms, whose market share is 
mostly secured by the development of their home 
wind energy market (Annex 1). Firm-specific polit-
ical resources (Table 1) such as public subsidies and 
public procurement policies are key factors in the 
emergence of these firms. The world wind turbine 
market seems fragmented at the regional level, with 
EU firms operating in the EU, the US, Latin America 
and Africa, but not in India or China, where national 
companies hold the market (Annex 2). 
Europe has the lead in wind power technology, 
with a complete supply chain, a professional func-
tion division, and comprehensive measurement 
and testing facilities, including public testing of 
wind farms, professional services, and equipment 
testing centres. Five companies, of which four are 
European, hold 90% of the world market. Europe-
an original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) are 
well represented among the world leaders: Vestas 
(Denmark – world leader), Enercon (Germany), 
Siemens (Germany), Gamesa (Spain), Repow-
er (Germany), Nordex (Germany) and Acciona 
(Spain). European turbine manufacturers are pre-
sent in other continents, with production facilities 
in Asia, North America and South America.
The quality of European components with high-
technology content and precision engineering 
(transmission, bearings, and blades) is now well 
established. European companies are among the 
top world leaders in this field (Siemens, ABB, etc.). 
Some ‘sensitive’ European components are export-
ed to China (ABB, Siemens, Hansen) and integrat-
ed into Chinese turbines when needed, especially 
in projects with due diligence conditions (projects 
financed by international financial institutions – 
World Bank, Asian Development Bank). 
The European wind energy market is a well-
structured, mature, competitive market, with 
European actors operating at every stage of the 
project. Europe is the largest wind energy market; 
in particular, Europe is the first market for offshore 
wind energy with a market share of 97% of MW 
installed (2010). The only non-European installa-
tions in 2011 are Chinese and Japanese. So far, Eu-
rope has a 20-year lead over the US (which should 
enter the market in 4-5 years) and China, which 
is just entering the market. This lead is observed 
across the whole value chain: R&D, foundations, 
equipments, interconnections and services (opera-
tion and maintenance). 
The wind capacity installed in the EU by the end 
of 2010 would in a normal year produce 181 TWh 
of electricity, representing 5.3% of electricity con-
sumption. Annual installations of wind power have 
increased steadily over the last 15 years from 814 
MW in 1995 to 9.295 MW in 2010, an annual aver-
age market growth of 17.6%. Interestingly enough, 
wind power installations accounted for 16.8% of 
new capacity installations in 2010, the first year 
since 2007 that wind power installations did not 
exceed any other generating technology33. In spite 
of this, perspectives for 2020 (low/high scenarios) 
provide figures such as 230/265 GW installed ca-
pacity, including 40-55 GW offshore (580.1/681.4 
TWh), which represents 14-17% of total EU elec-
tricity demand (depending on total demand in 
2020). EWEA supports and calls for 50% wind en-
ergy electricity in the EU by 2050.
Germany remains the EU country with the larg-
est installed capacity, followed by Spain, Italy, 
France and the UK. Increasing installations in 
emerging EU markets – offshore in Northern Eu-
rope, and onshore in South East Europe (Romania, 
Poland and Bulgaria) – offset the fall in installa-
tions in the mature onshore markets of Germany, 
the UK, and Spain. Due to ongoing improvements 
in turbine efficiency and higher fuel prices, wind 
power is increasing in economic competitiveness 
against conventional power production. Further-
more, at sites with high wind speeds on land, wind 
power is considered to be fully commercial today 
according to EWEA.
Technology plays a key role in the rising trend 
of turbine efficiency. Turbine size, power and com-
plexity have developed extremely rapidly, best evi-
denced by the increase in commercial turbine size 
by a factor of around 100 in 20 years (Figure 4). 
A common misunderstanding, as underlined by 
EWEA, is to consider wind energy as a mature 
33. EWEA further stresses that for only the second time 
since 1998, the EU power sector installed in 2010 more 
coal than it decommissioned, “highlighting the urgency 
of moving to a 30% greenhouse gas reduction target for 
2020” – we follow them on this. 
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technology, which could lead to a reduced R&D 
effort. 
MW-class turbines (above 1 MW) represent a 
market share of over 95%, leaving less than 5% for 
the smaller machines. Within the MW segment, 
turbines with capacities of 2.5 MW or above are be-
coming increasingly important, even for onshore 
siting. According to EWEA estimates, at present, 
production costs of energy for a 2 MW wind tur-
bine range from 5.3 to 6.1 euro cents (c€) per kWh, 
depending on the wind resources at the chosen 
site. According to experience curve analyses, the 
cost range is expected to decline to between 4.3 
and 5.5 c€/kWh by 2015.
Looking at jobs, 182 000 people were directly 
or indirectly employed in 2010 in the wind energy 
sector (Table 4). A significant share of direct wind 
energy employment (approximately 77%) is lo-
cated in three countries, Denmark, Germany and 
Spain, whose combined installed capacity repre-
sents 70% of the EU total. EWEA’s analysis con-
cludes that 15.1 jobs are created in the EU for each 
new MW installed. In addition, 0.4 jobs are created 
per MW of total installed capacity in operations 
and maintenance and other activities related to 
existing installations
Overall, wind turbine and component manufac-
turers are responsible for 59% of direct wind en-
ergy employment in the EU (Table 4). The EU wind 
sector could represent 446 000 jobs by 2020, and 
479 000 by 2030, with offshore progressively over-
taking onshore (Table 5).
table 4. Employment breakdown across sectors
Manufacturers 37%
Component manufacturers 22%
Developers 16%
Installation/repair/operations & maintenance 11%
IPP / utility 9%
Consultancy/engineering 3%
R&D/University 1%
Financial & insurance 0.3%
Others 1%
Source: European Wind Energy Association.
figure 5. Growth in size of commercial wind turbine designs
Source: Garrad Hassan and European Wind Energy Association.
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table 5. Perspectives on EU wind sector jobs by 2030
2008 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Onshore 143 782 148 057 200 870 290 276 228 104 185 478
Offshore 11 415 34 232 81 489 156 143 238 879 293 746
Source: European Wind Energy Association.
The typical wind energy job profiles required 
by the different industries display a wide range of 
skills and qualifications in all of the types of com-
pany operating in the sector (annex 3). 
3.2. The wind power value chain
The main factors driving wind power economics 
are investment costs, such as auxiliary costs for 
foundations and grid connection; operation and 
maintenance (O&M) costs; electricity production 
(depending on the average wind speed); and the 
discount rate. We focus on the two main costs 
associated with wind turbines during their life-
time: investment costs and O&M costs. Investment 
or “capital costs” are incurred in the initial installa-
tion phase, whereas O&M costs are recurring costs 
that are necessary for the continued proper opera-
tion of a wind turbine. 
3.2.1. Capital costs
Looking at capital costs, and focusing on onshore 
wind energy projects, EWEA estimates show that 
investment costs are dominated by the cost of 
the wind turbine34. The total investment cost of 
an average turbine installed in Europe is around 
€ 1.23 million per MW, including all additional 
costs for foundations, electrical installation and 
consultancy (in 2006 prices)35. The main costs are 
distributed as shown in Table 6. The single most 
important additional component (to the cost of the 
turbine itself) is the cost of grid connection, which, 
in some cases, can account for almost half of the 
auxiliary costs, followed by typically lower shares 
for foundation costs and the cost of the elec-
trical installation. Other cost components, such 
as control systems and land, account for a minor 
share of the total costs. 
34. Whereas the costs are much more evenly distributed in 
offshore technology. This results in the fact that costs 
for the foundations, installation and grid connection of 
offshore wind turbines are much higher than those of 
onshore turbines.
35. The costs for an average offshore wind turbine, in 
contrast, range anywhere between € 2 000 and 3 000 per 
kW.
table 6. Cost structure of a typical 2 MW turbine installed 
in Europe (in 2006€)
investment (1000/
mW)
share (%)
Turbine 928 75.6
Foundations 80 6.5
Electric installation 18 1.5
Grid connection 109 8.9
Control systems 4 0.3
Consultancy 15 1.2
Land 48 3.9
Financial costs 15 1.2
Road 11 0.9
TOTAL 1227 100
Note: Calculation based on selected data for European wind turbine installations.
Source: Risø DTU National Laboratory, Technical University of Denmark and Euro-
pean Wind Energy Association.
A typical wind turbine contains up to 8 000 dif-
ferent components. Table 7 breaks down the tur-
bine costs into its major components36, the two 
most important ones (tower and rotor blades) 
being untradable over long distances due to over-
whelming weight-related transportation costs. 
table 7. Cost/5 MW wind turbine component (%)
Wind turbine component cost (%)
Tower 26.3
Rotor blades 22.2
GearBox 12.91
Power converter 5.01
Transformer 3.59
Generator 3.44
Main frame 2.80
Pitch system 2.66
Main shaft 1.91
Rotor hub 1.37
Nacelle housing 1.35
Brake system 1.32
Yaw system 1.25
Rotor bearings 1.22
Screws 1.04
Cables 0.96
Source: European Wind Energy Association
For this reason, most of the component and 
turbine manufacturing stages are located in the 
country or region where the wind power capacity 
is to be installed – the EU in the hypothetical case 
described in Chart 1. Chart 1 provides first-hand 
expert estimates of local/foreign supply of differ-
ent materials as well as the strategic/non-strategic 
aspects of these for the EU. 
36. These figures are estimates based on a REpower 5 MW 
MM92 turbine with 45.3 meter blade length and a 
100 meter tower. 
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The location partly depends on upfront costs. 
Some parts represent a high technological risk 
(gearBox, bearing, generator and blades). Supplies 
in this case are usually secured by OEM own manu-
facturing (blades) or by vertical upstream integra-
tion in Europe to cope with possible disruption 
costs (e.g. Vestas, Gamesa and Siemens integrated 
gearBox suppliers in order to secure at least 20-
30% of their supplies). Some parts are also manu-
factured close to the development site because of 
logistic costs, which may sometimes be higher than 
the manufacturing cost (towers and blades). Some 
other parts can be easily supplied by subcontrac-
tors (towers), with the possible externalisation of 
the manufacturing process – yet these cannot be 
shipped across thousand of miles for obvious logis-
tic reasons. For offshore projects, tower manufac-
turing plants are usually located in ports in order 
to avoid land transport. The same occurs for on-
shore projects, where land transport is avoided as 
much as possible. All this makes the wind power 
supply chain a local and non-tradable chain 
for most of its costly components. Chart 1 thus 
shows that foreign penetration into the value 
chain is limited to raw materials (steel, alumin-
ium, copper, etc.) and low-tech/non-strategic 
components (nacelle frames, for instance).
But the location also partly depends on local 
policies. The quality of European (and US) wind 
energy projects is usually ensured through a heavy 
certification process (design evaluation conform-
ity statement and type test conformity statement 
– with the IEC Wind Turbine Standards as a bench-
mark for various countries). Internationally, the 
certification of wind power has more than 30 years 
history and actually began in Europe. Newcomers 
to the market need to meet the same conditions as 
European OEMs, which are already certified for 
their turbines. This head start represents a com-
petitive advantage for ‘historical’ actors in the mar-
ket (European and American companies), placing 
them in front of Indian or Chinese companies. 
Moving upstream in the value chain, which is 
more connected to world market, two issues are 
worth noting. The first relates to fluctuations in 
world raw material prices, and the second to rare 
earths. China dominates the market for rare earths 
and accounts for 95-97% of world production. But 
China is in the process of decreasing exportation 
through export quotas, which have a considerable 
impact on export prices. New mining projects are 
already in the pipeline in order to counter this de-
pendency. Nevertheless, studies are not clear as to 
whether or not there will be a shortage of supplies, 
leading to price inflation. Some sources predict a 
shortage of Neodymium used in the wind turbine 
industry (Box 2).
Overall, the need to manufacture the heavy 
and large components (towers, blades, nacelle 
assembling) close to the exploitation site means 
EU FMAs are sustainable ones. Foreign penetra-
tion into the European wind market depends on 
strategic FDI (acquisition of turbine manufactur-
ers) or strategic agreements with utilities and de-
velopers. From time to time and on a small scale, 
foreign companies may export turbines to Europe, 
but this remains uncommon. For large-scale pro-
jects, foreign presence in Europe must go through 
local production by opening new facilities, which 
means employment, investment or the acquisition 
of European companies. US, Chinese and Indian 
companies present in Europe operate this way. Oc-
casionally, Chinese turbines may be found on the 
European market, but in this case they will prob-
ably have a significant level of European content.
3.2.2. Operation and maintenance costs
Operation and maintenance costs constitute the 
second major share of the total annual costs of a 
wind turbine. For a new turbine, O&M costs may 
easily make up 20-25% of the total levelised cost 
per kWh produced over the lifetime of the turbine. 
If the turbine is fairly new, the share may be only 
10-15%, but this may increase to at least 20-35% by 
box 2. rare earths in direct drive and gear-
driven wind turbines
Globally, the demand for rare earths from the wind turbine indus-
try will follow the evolution of new installations and should increase 
sharply. Turbine synchronous generators use either electromagnets (with 
copper coils) or permanent magnets to generate electricity. The latter 
consist mainly of Neodymium but also Praseodymium and Dysprosium 
and are mainly used in the manufacturing of direct drive turbines (with-
out gearBoxes). The choice between a direct drive configuration and a 
gearBox is made on the basis of many technical and economic param-
eters. Direct drive turbines present several advantages, including higher 
power density and no gearBoxes (which represent a high technological 
risk). When it comes to maintenance, especially for offshore projects, 
direct drive turbines may be cost-saving. One German manufacturer 
has always produced direct drive turbines (Enercon). Several companies 
have started testing or have already produced models using permanent 
magnets (direct drive or gear-driven), including leaders like Vestas, Sie-
mens and Gamesa. 
At this stage the vast majority of turbines are made with asynchro-
nous generators. Depending on sources, average use of Neodymium is 
200 to 300 kg/MW for direct drive turbines, against 20 kg/MW for a gear-
driven turbine with permanent magnet.
Some experts estimate that European Neodymium demand from the 
wind turbine industry will be multiplied by 5 by 2020 and by 8 by 2030, 
according to the curve for new capacities installed, if no new R&D devel-
opments are made to improve gearBoxes or to use more sophisticated 
solutions for the direct drive.
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chart 1. Wind energy vertical value chain (linked to wind turbine components)
raw material 
suppliers
steelplate: world market
steeliron: world market
cast iron: world market
copper for cabling: world market. Refinery led by Chinese companies. Germany was leading 
exporter of semi-refined copper in 2009 (Aurubis). 
aluminium: world market, led by 5 main groups (Alcoa/US, Rio Tinto Alcoa/Canada, Chinalco/
China, Russal/Russia, Hydro/Norway). 
concrete: world market
nickel for casted components
GFRP (glass fiber reinforced polymer): supplied mainly by China
CFRP (carbon fiber reinforced polymer): see above
balsawood: main suppliers are Papua New Guinea and Brazil.
polyester, epoxy, polyurethane, rubber, ceramics
permanent magnets / gearless turbines (which include rare earth – neodymium mainly): China 
world leader in rare earths (97% of world production)
teflon (PTFE)
components 
manufacturing
– foundation (more important for offshore). For onshore: concrete (90%), stainless steel, 
steelplate. Made in Europe (project site)
– tower: steelplate, copper, concrete. Low tech’ content, ideally made near the project (to lower 
logistic costs)
– cables: made mainly in Europe for offshore
– nacelle and controls 
– controllers a& electronics: customized by OEMs in general 
– transformer: stainless steel. Can be of different origins, generally in the projects’ country due to 
national standard requirements 
– generator & power electronics: stainless steel or cast iron (shaft), permanent magnets, copper 
coil. High tech’ content, made in Europe 
– cooling system (for the generator) 
– gear Box: cast iron, stainless steel. Strategic component, made in Europe 
– main shaft: steel or cast iron. Different origins, not strategic 
– shaft brake/yaw brake: cast iron and steel. Not strategic, different origin 
– high speed shaft: steel 
– yaw motor / yaw bearing: steel. Strategic component, usually made in Europe 
– main bearing: steel-main bearing housing: cast iron; High tech’ content, made in Europe (SKF, 
etc.)
– nacelle frame: cast iron, nacelle cover: GRFP Low tech’ content, can be made everywhere (China 
mainly)
wind measure instruments (anemometer, wind vane)
– rotor 
– hub: cast iron – pitch bearing/pitch motor: cast iron, stainless steel. High tech’ content, usually 
made in Europe 
– root cover: GRFP; Low tech’ content, can be mede everywhere (China mainly)
blades: glass-fiber reinforced polymer composite (with epoxy, polyester, etc.), carbon fiber foam, 
balsawood. Strategic part, usually made by OEMs or LM Wind Power (EU), world leader in blade 
manufacturing
Turbine 
manufacturers
All steps described hereunder are done in the EU by EU companies, unless design and engineering 
made by foreign companies which must be certified for the EU market.
– design, engineering, certification, software, assembly, tests, transportation, construction, lift, 
commissioning, operation
Source : EWEA + direct interviews
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the end of the turbine’s lifetime. As a result, O&M 
costs are attracting greater attention, as manufac-
turers attempt to significantly reduce these costs by 
developing new turbine designs that require fewer 
regular service visits and less turbine downtime. 
O&M costs are variable costs related to a limited 
number of cost components, and include insur-
ance, regular maintenance, repairs, spare parts 
and administration. These components vary ac-
cording to the type, size, and age of the turbine, 
given that O&M costs increase with the age of the 
turbine. 
Operation costs are control-oriented costs 
that are necessary to run wind turbines, such as 
site management, staff, tools and equipment, and 
supervisory control and data acquisition37 costs. 
These costs are not directly involved in repairing 
or overhauling turbine components, but play an 
important role in overall O&M costs. 
Maintenance costs are directly associated with 
wind turbines. Each component has an estimated 
lifetime within the overall 20-year turbine lifetime. 
Maintenance costs are related to turbine size and 
configuration, and generally escalate over time as 
the machines age and parts wear out.
From a life-cycle perspective, operation and 
maintenance make up for a significant part (about 
1/3, see Chart 2) of the overall cost/value added of 
a wind farm project. O&M costs for onshore wind 
energy are generally estimated to be around c€ 1.2 
to 1.5 per kWh of wind power produced over the 
total lifetime of a turbine. Spanish data indicates 
that less than 60% of this amount goes strictly to 
the O&M of the turbine and installations, with the 
rest equally distributed between labour costs and 
spare parts. The remaining 40% is split equally be-
tween insurance, land rental and overheads.
The O&M market was estimated at € 3.3 billion 
in 2010 and is expected to grow at 19% compound 
37. Computer systems that monitor and control the wind 
farm.
annual growth rate (CAGR) to reach € 9.2 billion 
in 2016. Europe was the largest wind O&M mar-
ket in 2010. China is expected to become the larg-
est market in 2016. 
GearBoxes, generators and turbine blades are 
the three main components that need regular ser-
vicing and make up approximately 80% of total 
turbine maintenance costs. Independent service 
providers (ISPs) are gaining traction in many ma-
ture wind markets38. Offshore, which accounts for 
only 5% of the present O&M market, has a higher 
O&M cost than onshore O&M. Limited accessibil-
ity, lower availability of trained personnel and lo-
gistic issues make it difficult to provide offshore 
O&M services, resulting in higher costs.
Overall, Europe has a competitive advantage 
in O&M services thanks to several decades of 
experience. O&M is a key issue for onshore wind 
energy, and even more so for offshore. O&M should 
be carried out as far as possible using local teams 
to reduce costs. Little or no foreign penetration 
is currently observed in O&M supply chain seg-
ments (local staff, teams, subsidiaries, thus em-
ployment, and investment). Development of ISPs 
and strategic alliances between ISPs in order to 
offer a comprehensive service for all components 
(e.g. Global Wind Alliance) could be fostered, as 
well as strategic agreements between ISPs and 
OEMs and contracts between ISPs and develop-
ers. European companies could use this advantage 
to foster their presence on foreign markets with a 
structured offer in terms of services. 
3.3. Sustaining EU leadership
Applying Table 1 (first-mover advantages and 
disadvantages) to the wind energy market, it 
38. Offshore wind turbine installations account for 1.7% of 
global cumulative wind energy capacity, but represent 
5% of the global wind O&M market. Offshore wind O&M 
costs are 2 to 2.5 times higher than onshore O&M costs.
chart 2. Wind energy project life cycle (cost ratio)
Development: permits, 
environmental studies, 
geotechnical services, 
measuring mast, 
engineering
3-4%
Construction: turbine, 
foundation, grid 
connection installation
60-65%
O&M
(Operation and 
maintenance)
25-35%
Dismantling
2-3%
Source : EWEA + direct interviews
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follows that the outstanding position of the EU in 
the wind energy global value chain is primarily 
due to its technological leadership (early mover), 
itself due to historically high R&D levels, the pre-
emption of the EU internal market with an early 
positioning in countries such as Germany, the UK 
and Italy, and public incentives and standards 
propelling EU supply chain (and particularly tech-
nology) deployment. 
The fact that the supply chain is local or “cap-
tive” in many of its segments, particularly down-
stream, does not necessarily give the EU a sustain-
able FMA over the coming decade(s): sustaining 
R&D expenses, enhancing the incentive and regu-
latory EU framework and circumventing the po-
tential threats roused by foreign dependence on 
potentially key raw materials (rare earths) are 
some of the main drivers of EU sustainable FMAs, 
which are pinpointed below. 
3.3.1. Addressing R&D and technology 
challenges 
 m Technology is moving fast, through incremen-
tal innovations; breakthrough technologies are 
much less likely in the near future (at least for 
onshore projects, see Box 3). 
 m New turbines and components are to be de-
signed to meet increasing EU demand for re-
newable energy: the development and testing 
of a large-scale turbine prototype (15-20 MW) is 
a necessary step, along with the implementation 
of testing facilities and the standardisation of 
harbours to service the next generation of wind 
turbines (see Chart 2). 
 m Development of offshore structures: the de-
velopment and testing of new structures, the 
demonstration of mass manufacturing pro-
cesses and a procedure for structures integrat-
ing larger turbines than onshore ones are still 
ahead.
 m Gear-driven versus direct drive turbines: the 
challenge is to replace traditional gearBoxes 
and high-speed generators with bigger, low-
speed generators that do not require a geared 
transmission. The objectives are to gain weight 
and reliability and to cut costs. GE and Siemens 
are set to achieve this. Enercon (Germany) has 
been producing direct drive turbines since 1993. 
This is of considerable interest for offshore pro-
jects, where maintenance is a key issue in terms 
of costs.
 m Grid integration: the next step should consist in 
demonstrating a long-distance high-voltage di-
rect current (HVDC), offshore flexible connec-
tion to at least two countries, as well as multi-
terminal offshore solutions.
 m Wind resource assessment and spatial planning: 
the publication of an EU27 Wind Atlas is expect-
ed by 2015, prior to the statistical forecast dis-
tribution on wind speed and energy production.
The funding for the EU roadmap requirements 
(Chart 3) are not yet secured. As EWEA stresses, 
and as we have already mentioned, “a common 
misunderstanding is to consider wind energy as a 
mature technology, which could lead to a reduced 
R&D effort”. For the first time, in 2010, the EU wind 
energy market witnessed investment flows for off-
shore projects by pension funds, which represents 
a positive – albeit currently unpredicTable – trend 
for the sector. 
3.3.2. Increasing access to non-EU markets for 
EU firms
 m Export: the European lead in several parts of 
the value chain, namely manufacturing and 
services (components, O&M), could be fostered 
to gain new market share on the world wind 
energy market through a further reduction of 
tariff and non-tariff barriers in major potential 
importing countries. 
 m Components: strategic European parts are used 
in the turbines of China’s leaders in wind tur-
bine manufacturing (Sinovel, Goldwind, Dong-
Fang and United Power). Components such as 
gearBoxes, blades, bearings, converters and 
control systems used in Chinese turbines are 
partly ‘made in Europe’, with the risk of these 
being transferred through loose intellectual 
property (IP) protection. 
 m Offshore: new European projects are in the 
pipeline. The EU market is likely to experience 
a sharp increase in terms of total MW to be in-
stalled and project size (MW). Larger, deeper 
and more distant (from the shore) projects are 
driving innovation on substructures and vessels. 
The US, South Korea, China, Taiwan, Canada 
box 3: incremental versus breakthrough 
innovation in the wind energy industry
Onshore: mature market where innovation is mainly incremental. 
Breakthrough innovation could come through vertical axis turbines. But 
the ‘blade-rotor-nacelle’ model is a proven technology. After 30 years of 
growing production capacity through increasing wind turbine size, the 
challenge now is how to produce more electricity without increasing the 
turbine size. This optimisation is one of the main drivers of R&D.
Offshore: immature market. More possibilities in terms of break-
through innovation, especially for foundations, cables, rotors and 
interconnectors.
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and Japan should be the next markets for fu-
ture development. China is the most advanced 
(behind the EU) on this subject (manufacturing 
turbines, project development, etc.). Foreign 
companies are announcing the development of 
new turbines.
3.3.3. Coping with threats
 m Rare earths: China has a monopoly on the pro-
duction of rare earths, with about 95-97% of the 
total. At present, there is no other country that 
can supply Neodymium (the rare earth used in 
permanent magnet manufacturing for genera-
tors). There are growing concerns among EU 
firms about China’s export quota policy, which 
impacts world prices. Yet substitution technolo-
gies could be developed and new mines are cur-
rently being explored. 
 m Raw material price instability: dependency on 
world market price fluctuations for steel, iron, 
copper, nickel, aluminium, glass fibre and car-
bon fibre. China is usually the leading country 
for these raw materials.
 m Finance & economics: securing renewable pro-
ject development at EU level is a priority, given 
the current Member States debt crisis and un-
predicTable year-to-year budget changes. 
4. hypercompetitioN: the 
eu photovoltaic sector
4.1. Facts and figures: EU 
leader in installed capacities 
Over the last 10 years, progress has been impres-
sive in the PV industry worldwide. The total 
installed PV capacity in the world has multiplied 
by a factor of 27, from 1.5 GW in 2000 to 39.5 GW 
Large scale turbine prototype
Development & testing of a 
large scale turbine prototype 
(10-20 MW)
R&D Programme focused on new turbines designs and use of new materials
Implementation of testing facilities 
and demo for new turbines, 
components, manufacturing 
processes
Testing facilities and demo
Demonstration of an optimised logistic 
strategy Standardised harbours to service the next generation of wind turbines
Development & testing of new 
substructures 4 prototypes of new substructures
Demonstration of mass 
manufacturing processes and 
procedures for substructures
Demonstration with wind farm as virtual power plant:
Demonstration of long distance HVDC
Offshore flexibility connection to at least 2 countries
Demonstration of multi terminal offshore solutions
Two operational sites
Publication of a EU 27 MS Wind Atlas
Wind resources assessment:
5-10 measurement 
campaigns
Spatial planning:
Development of Spatial Planning 
Instruments
EU spatial planning implemented
Statistical forecast distribution on 
wind speed and energy 
production
Results of the public acceptance 
analysis
New 
turbines 
and 
components
Offshore 
components
Grid 
integration
Enable wind 
development
2010 2012 2015 2017 2020
Implementation of 
additional facilities and demo
Chart 3. WIND – Technology Roadmap 2010-2020
Source: European Commission, DG Energy.
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in 2010 – a yearly growth rate of about 40%. Such 
growth has proved to be sustainable, allowing 
the industry to develop at a stable rate. In 2010, 
the photovoltaic (PV) industry production more 
than doubled and reached a worldwide produc-
tion volume of 23.5 GWp of photovoltaic modules. 
Business analysts predict that investments in PV 
technology could double, from € 35-40 billion in 
2010 to over € 70 billion in 2015, while prices for 
consumers should continuously decrease over the 
same period.
The EU, having overtaken Japan, is now the 
clear leader in terms of market and total installed 
capacity (75% of total cumulative world PV ca-
pacities), thanks largely to German past initia-
tives (now about 18 GW installed capacities) that 
have helped create global momentum. Japan (3.6 
MW) and the US (2.5 GW) are far behind and are 
the only countries with more than 1 GW installed 
outside Europe. The situation should evolve in 
the coming years with the rapid growth recorded 
in other regions such as North America and Asia. 
China in particular has entered the top 10 on the 
market and should reach its first GW in 2011. China 
is expected to become a major market in the com-
ing years. 
Current solar cell technologies are well estab-
lished and provide a reliable product, with suf-
ficient efficiency and energy output for at least a 
25-year lifetime (Box 4). Crystalline silicon (c-Si) 
technologies have dominated the market for the 
last 30 years and now represent 85% of the market. 
C-Si technologies have been used mainly in both 
stand-alone and on-grid systems. Within the c-Si 
technologies, mono- and multi-crystalline cells 
are produced in fairly equal proportion. However, 
multi-crystalline cells are gaining market share. 
Ribbon c-Si represents less than 5% of the mar-
ket. Crystalline silicon technology is a field-proven 
mature technology where innovation is incremen-
tal. R&D is focused on production, especially on 
process optimisation in order to reduce costs and 
wastes. 
The second generation of thin film technology 
represents a market share of around 15%. While 
amorphous silicon (a-Si) has been the preferred 
clear thin film technology used over the past 30 
years, its market share has decreased significant-
ly compared to more advanced and competitive 
technologies, such as Cadmium telluride (CdTe), 
which grew from a 2% market share in 2005 to 13% 
in 2010. The thin film technology is less mature 
than crystalline silicon and its yield is still lower. 
Fundamental R&D is focused on technology inno-
vation (Box 5). 
When compared to conventional renewables 
such as wind and biomass, PV is the most expen-
sive in terms of cost per installed kilowatt or kilo-
watt-hour and is, in general, currently more expen-
sive than traditional means of producing electricity 
(Barton, 2007). Yet over the last 20 years, PV has 
shown impressive price reductions, with the price 
of PV modules decreasing by over 20% every time 
the cumulative volume of PV modules sold dou-
bles. System prices have declined accordingly; over 
the last five years, a price decrease of 50% has been 
achieved in Europe. According to EPIA, system 
prices are expected to decrease in the next 10 years 
by 36-51%. The cost of PV electricity generation in 
Europe could decrease from € 0.16-0.35 per kWh in 
2010 to € 0.08-0.18 per kWh in 2020, depending on 
the system size and irradiance level.
Figure 5 displays the main PV cell R&D results in 
terms of efficiency since 1975 and the impressive 
development of innovations over time in a limit-
ed number of countries (the EU, Japan, Germany 
and, recently, Israel and China). The best results 
obtained are not developed on a large scale in 
open B2C or even B2B markets: they remain lim-
ited to laboratories or very specific uses such as the 
aerospace industry. 
The production of PV panels is expensive and 
requires large-scale precision manufacturing capa-
bilities. Nevertheless, the industry is quite decen-
tralised, as shown in annex 10, which lists all firms 
shipping over 50 MWp around the world, as well as 
box 4. most common available commercial pv 
technologies
crystalline silicon technology
m Crystalline silicon cells are made from thin slices cut from a single crys-
tal of silicon (monocrystalline) or from a block of silicon (polycrystalline).
m Their efficiency ranges between 12% and 17%.
m Three main types of crystalline cells can be distinguished: Monocrys-
talline (mono c-Si), polycrystalline (or Multicrystalline – multi c-Si), Rib-
bon sheets (ribbon-sheet c-Si)
m Most common technology representing around 85% of the market 
today
thin film technology
m Thin film modules are constructed by depositing extremely thin layers 
of photosensitive materials onto a low-cost baking such as glass, stain-
less steel or plastic.
m Lower production costs compared to the more material-intensive crys-
talline technology, a price advantage…
m…which is currently counter-balanced by substantially lower efficiency 
rates (from 5% to 13%).
m Four types of thin film modules (depending on the active material 
used) are commercially available at the moment: Amorphous silicon 
(a-Si), Cadmium telluride (CdTe), Copper Indium/gallium Diselenide/
disulphide (CIS, CIGS), Multi junction cells (a-Si/m-Si)
m Around 5% of the market
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firms shipping smaller amounts in developing na-
tions. This is a moderately concentrated industry; 
the four leading firms produce about 45% of the 
market (Barton, 2007, using 2005 data). Another 
study lists five firms, Sharp, Kyocera, Shell Solar, 
BP Solar and Schott Solar, as holding 60% of the 
market. The industry consolidated heavily in the 
1990s. Today’s firms are concentrated in the devel-
oped world, but there are five firms in the develop-
ing world, each producing at least 10 MWp, mak-
ing it closer to the “hypercompetition” narrative 
than to the conventional competition one, where a 
few historical firms reap the profits of patents and 
increasing returns.
Finally, the PV industry has created nearly 
100 000 jobs in Europe in the last few years, un-
der the impetus (in descending order) of Germa-
ny, Spain, Italy and France, through an extensive 
list of direct and indirect occupations (annex 11). 
Labour-intensive segments of the supply chain are 
mostly downstream, as we will see below. 
4.2. The PV value chain
The PV market and industry can be broken 
down into one complete process, from the first 
production stages for metallurgical silicon to the 
turn-key system for the end customer, including 
all services linked to such systems. Different tech-
nologies within the European PV industry, such 
as crystalline and thin film technology, lead to 
different production processes and value chains 
(Chart 4). 
4.2.1. Market structure
Upstream activities include all stages, from the 
manufacturing of equipment and materials to the 
production of modules, inverters and other balance 
of system (BOS) elements. Supply of certain mate-
rials and equipment is concentrated in the hands 
of a few very large players. For example, about 70 
companies are active in polysilicon production. 
However, in 2009, more than 90% of the total 
supply was manufactured by seven major players 
from Europe, the US and Japan: Hemlock, Wacker 
Chemie, REC, Tokuyama, MEMC, Mitsubishi and 
Sumitomo. Many Chinese companies are currently 
ramping up capacity and are expected to account 
for a larger share of the polysilicon market over the 
next few years. 
The market is more segmented and competitive 
in the area of wafer and cell manufacturing (Ta-
ble 8). More than 200 companies were active in 
this sector in 2009, and the number of companies 
was estimated at 350 in 2010. Around 1 000 compa-
nies produced c-Si modules in 2010.
Also with respect to inverter production, the top 
ten companies produce more than 80% of the in-
verters sold on the market, even though there are 
more than 300 companies active in this segment.
In the case of thin film module manufactur-
ing, about 160 companies were active in 2009 
(Table 9). Some 130 of these companies produce 
silicon-based thin films, around 30 produce CIGS/
CIS thin films, and a handful of companies are 
active in CdTe. There are currently more than 50 
companies that offer turnkey c-Si production lines. 
Fewer than 30 manufacturers provide the PV in-
dustry with thin film production lines.
table 8. Number of companies worldwide in the crystalline 
silicon value chain (2009)
Silicon Ingots 
Wafers
Cells Modules
Number of 
companies
75 208 239 30
Production 
capacity
130 000 
tonnes
15 000 MW 18 000 MW 19 000 MW
Effective 
production
90 000 
tonnes
10 000 MW 9 000 MW 7 000 MW
Source: Energy Focus, Photon, Joint Research Centre and European Photovoltaic 
Industry Association.
box 5. main pv technologies under 
development or starting to be commercialised
concentrated pv
m Some solar cells are designed to operate with concentrated sunlight. 
These cells are built into concentrating collectors that use a lens to 
focus the sunlight onto the cells
m Main idea: to use very little of the expensive semi-conducting PV mate-
rial while collecting as much sunlight as possible
m Efficiencies are in the range of 20% to 45%.
flexible cells
m Based on a similar production process to thin film cells, when active 
material is deposited in a thin plastic, the cell can be flexible
m Used for new applications: building integration (roof-tiles) and end-
consumer applications
dye-sensitized solar cells
m Inspired by photosynthesis
m Several laboratories and companies are working on the subjects: Tel-
Aviv University, State Key Laboratory of Metal Matix composite (Shangha 
Jiao-Tong University), Konarka Power Plastic solar cell technology (USA – 
thin film dye sensitized solar cells), synthetic solar energy storage (Sun 
Catalytix / USA – Photosynthetically inspired energy storage & artificial 
photosynthesis)
m PV gel
m Quantum dot cells
m Organic cells
m Inorganic cells
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table 9. Number of companies worldwide in the thin film 
value chain (2009)
CdTe a-Si a-Si/u-SI CI(G)S
Number of 
companies
4 131 30
Production 1 100 MW <300 
MW
<400 
MW
<200 MW
Source: Energy Focus, Photon, Joint Research Centre and European Photovoltaic 
Industry Association.
The latest figures regarding industry structure 
are given in the PV Status Report 2011 (Joint Re-
search Centre Scientific and Technical Reports, 
European Commission). The number of companies 
involved in PV increased sharply in 2010 compared 
to the 2009 figures given above. It is now estimat-
ed that more than 100 companies are producing or 
starting up polysilicon production and more than 
350 companies are producing solar cells. More 
than 200 companies are involved in thin film solar 
cell activities, ranging from basic R&D activities 
to major manufacturing activities, and over 120 of 
them have announced the start of or an increase in 
production. In 2005, for the first time, production 
of thin film solar modules reached more than 100 
MW per annum. The first 100 MW thin film facto-
ries became operational in 2007, followed by the 
first 1 GW factory in 2010. If all expansion plans are 
carried out in time, thin film production capacity 
could be 17 GW, or 21% of the total 80 GW in 2012, 
and 27 GW, or 26% of a total of 102 GW in 2015, ac-
cording to the report.
The downstream part of the value chain 
includes:
 m Wholesalers operating as intermediaries be-
tween the manufacturers and the installer or 
end customer;
 m System developers who offer their services in 
building turnkey PV installations;
 m Owners of PV installations selling their power to 
the grid. 
Many small to medium enterprises (SMEs) are 
involved in these activities and most are locally or-
ganised. As such, this part of the value chain is very 
fragmented and difficult to track. The engineering, 
procurement and construction (EPC) companies in-
volved in the development of PV systems are expe-
rienced in obtaining finance, selecting the correct 
components and advising on a suiTable location and 
system design. Most are familiar with local legal, 
administrative and grid connection requirements. 
They can guide the PV system owner through the 
different types of support mechanisms. EPC compa-
nies also physically install the PV system using ei-
ther internal personnel or qualified subcontractors. 
As a result of the latest technological developments 
in building integrated PV (BIPV) and concentrating 
PV (CPV), some developers have gained specific ex-
pertise and are now specialising in these areas. 
PV systems have a typical lifespan of at least 25 
years. At the end of its life, the system is decom-
missioned and the modules are recycled. In Eu-
rope, the PV Cycle association set up a voluntary 
take back scheme with a large number of collec-
tion points already established in different EU 
countries, where PV modules are collected and 
sent to specialised PV recycling facilities. The re-
cycled materials (such as glass, aluminium and 
semiconductor materials) can then be re-used for 
the production of PV or other products. 
4.2.2. Cost structure and labour-intensive 
segments
The price of a PV system is divided between the 
following elements:
 m PV modules;
 m Inverter (enables connection of the system to 
the electricity grid);
 m BOS or structural components (for mounting 
and connecting the modules);
 m The cost of installation (including project de-
velopment, administrative requirements, grid 
connection, planning, engineering and project 
management, construction and margins of the 
installers).
The module price reflected around 45-60% of 
the total installed system price in 2010, depend-
ing on the segment and the technology (figure 6). 
It is therefore still the most important cost driver. 
Additional costs must be considered for the total 
system lifecycle of the PV system, which neverthe-
less leave the breakdown of costs given in figure 6 
unchanged:
mm Cost of operation and maintenance services (in-
cludes margin);
mm Cost of one inverter replacement for each invert-
er (because the lifetime of inverters is shorter 
than that of PV modules);
mm Land cost (for large-scale ground-mounted sys-
tems only);
mm Cost of take back and recycling the PV system at 
the end of its lifetime.
While in 2005, PV modules represented almost 
75% of a PV system price for a large ground-
mounted installation, nowadays they account for 
less than 60% of this price. For small residential 
systems, this may even be below 50%. The remain-
der includes the cost of the inverter and other bal-
ance of system elements (such as cables, mounting 
structures, etc.) as well as the cost and margins 
of wholesalers and installers, which are close to 
the end market. It is worth noting that the price 
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chart 4. Supply chain components for crystalline silicon and thin film technologies
Source: National Renewable Energy Laboratory, US Department of Energy.
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of inverters has followed a similar price learning 
curve to that of PV modules. Prices for some BOS 
elements have not decreased at the same pace. The 
prices of the raw materials used in these elements 
(typically copper, steel and stainless steel) have 
been more volatile. Installation costs have fallen at 
different rates depending on the maturity of the 
market and the type of application. For example, 
some mounting structures designed for specific 
types of installations (such as BIPV) can be set up 
in half the time it takes to install a more complex 
version. This obviously reduces the total installa-
tion costs. Reductions in the prices of materials 
(such as mounting structures), cables, land use 
and installation account for much of the decrease 
in BOS costs. Another contributor to the decrease 
in BOS and installation-related costs is the in-
crease in efficiency at module level. More efficient 
modules imply lower costs for balance of system 
equipment, installation-related costs and land use.
If we look at typical small rooftop (3 kWp) instal-
lations in mature markets, in only 5 years the share 
of the PV modules in the total system price has 
fallen from about 60-75% to as low as 40-60%, de-
pending on the technology. The inverter accounts 
for roughly 10% of the total system price and the 
cost of engineering and procurement makes up 
about 7% of this price. The remaining costs repre-
sent the other balance of system components and 
the cost of installation (figure 7). Thus, at least 
50-55% of the total value of a PV system is cre-
ated close to the end market, of which 80% was 
located in EU countries in 2010.
Table 10 summarises the main benefits of the 
current EU PV market and cost structures for the 
EU. Among the four key segments of the supply 
chains, two (BOS and installation) are close to the 
end market, while the third (PV inverter) is a ma-
jor exporter. The fourth segment (PV module) may 
appear to be detrimental to the EU, but although 
only about 15% of PV modules are assembled in 
the EU, more than 30% of the value is added in 
the EU.
Figures 9 and 10 provide average estimates of 
the cost ratio of the various components (electric-
ity, labour, material and equipment) for each of 
the main segments of the PV chain (cell, modules, 
inverter, BOS and installation). It is clear that cell 
and module production is very energy – and mate-
rial/equipment-intensive, while BOS and inverter 
supply entails higher labour costs; the most labour-
intensive segment is installation. Bearing in mind 
that EU close-to-market segments are BOS and in-
stallation, and that inverters are exported due to 
the high performance of EU firms (in 2010, about 
80% of all PV inverters worldwide were produced 
in the EU), the overall prospects for job creation 
in the EU PV supply chain are bright. STable and 
sustainable PV market development can generate 
a large number of local jobs.
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figure 7. PV value chain – average cost breakdown figure 8. Costs of PV system elements
Source: European Photovoltaic Industry Association, EuPD, Navigant Consulting, 
Photon, Consulting, SolarBuzz.
Source: European Photovoltaic Industry Association unpublished data.
table 10. A summary of PV cost structure and benefits for 
the EU
PV modules
The module price reflects only 
45-60% of the total system price
Only 15% is assembled in Europe
But >30% of the value (material, 
equipment, etc.) is created in 
Europe  
8.5 billion business in Europe
BOS
Represents 10-20% of the total 
system price
Close to the end market 
5 billion business in Europe
PV inverters
The inverter price reflects 6-14% 
of the total system price
90% of the European production 
-> export to market outside Europe
4 billion business in Europe
installation
Represents 21-26% of the total 
system price
Close to the end market
8.5 billion business in Europe
Source: European Photovoltaic Industry Association
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figure 9. Marimekko graph for c-Si PV systems
figure 10. Marimekko graph for thin film PV system
Source: European Photovoltaic Industry Association unpublished data.
Source: European Photovoltaic Industry Association unpublished data.
PV modules
PV
inverter
Balance of
system Installation
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
overhead/electricity
labour
materials
equipment
% system price
PV modules
PV
inverter
Balance of
system Installation
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
overhead/electricity
labour
materials
equipment
% system price
study 01/20122 8 IddrI
The Muddle over Green race
4.3. Foreign competition 
in the value chain
Only some components such as modules, cells and 
other electrical items can be produced outside 
Europe:
 m Wafers, cells and modules: Chinese compa-
nies dominate the world production of cells and 
modules. In terms of wafers, the global produc-
tion capacity was between 30 and 35 GW in 2010, 
of which more than 55% in China. Germany ac-
counts for more than 10% of global capacities, 
followed by Japan, Taiwan, Norway and the US. 
 m Crystalline-silicon cell and module capaci-
ties are now located mainly in Asia. EPIA 
estimates that global c-SI cell production was 
around 27 to 28 GW in 2010. Almost 50% of 
the capacity is located in China; the rest is 
produced in Taiwan (over 15%), the EU (over 
10%), Japan (just under 10%) and the US 
(less than 5%). Module production capacities 
for c-SI are estimated to have been slightly 
higher and could have ranged between 30 
and 32 GW in 2010.
 m The global production capacity for thin film 
(TF) modules reached around 3.5 GW in 2010. 
This is likely to increase to more than 5 GW 
in 2011 and could reach 6 to 8.5 GW in 2012. 
Today, copper (gallium) indium (di)selenide 
modules represent about 15% of the total TF 
capacity, with the remainder equally distrib-
uted between cadmium telluride and silicon 
TF. However, by 2012, EPIA expects that each 
of the TF technologies will represent an equal 
share in terms of production capacity. While 
a large proportion of c-Si modules are assem-
bled in China, most of the TF manufacturing 
plants are located in other parts of the world, 
the leaders being the US, the EU, Japan and 
Malaysia.
 m Inverters: 80% of world production is con-
centrated in Europe.
 m Other electrical items: equipment, components 
and materials (wires, BOS, circuit breakers) 
may have different countries of origin.
 m Structure integration includes the equipment 
and technologies permitting the interface be-
tween the roof and the modules. These are de-
veloped mainly in Europe. 
 m Installation: labour-intensive, carried out by lo-
cal teams.
 m Engineering: carried out locally by local teams.
 m Grid connection: connection procedures differ 
from one country to another; they are linked to 
local regulations, varying from 2-4 weeks (Ger-
many) to several months (France). They are dif-
ficult to delocalise. 
 m Sales and development: carried out locally by 
local teams.
 m O&M and insurance: local teams for O&M and 
local insurance companies.
Modules and cells are the main parts for which 
international competition is heavily present. Chi-
na and Taiwan have dominated module and cell 
production since 2007, ahead of Japan and the 
US. With only small quantities (less than 1 GW an-
nually) of modules shipped and installed during 
2000-2003, local markets used to be supplied by 
local production. From 2004 onwards, however, 
an increasing number of Japanese modules were 
imported by the EU in order to supply its rapidly 
growing market. The same occurred with Chinese 
modules from 2007 onwards. In 2010, tier 1 and 
2 Chinese majors and emerging Asian producers 
continued to capture foreign market share, bene-
fiting from an average 15% price discount on Japa-
nese/Western producers, with heavy environmen-
tal costs.
The disparity in terms of installations between 
the EU and the rest of the world should decrease 
over the next five years. On the supply side, this 
imbalance should progressively decline:
 m The relative share of transportation in the cost 
of a PV module will increase, as module prices 
are decreasing while transport costs are evolv-
ing in the opposite direction. This should en-
courage production closer to the end market.
 m With continuously decreasing prices for PV 
modules, the share of the module in the to-
tal PV system value will further decline in the 
coming years (figure 10), a rising share of the 
valued added being captured by local provid-
ers (installation and BOS). 
4.4. Consolidating EU strengths
The most valuable PV markets are located in 
OECD countries, in the US and the EU in partic-
ular. The late start from Chinese firms on specific 
and mature PV segments (cells and modules) has 
not made the country a high value-added market 
so far. The strengths of the EU in high-tech and 
value-added technologies (thin film, CPV) and 
value chain segments (inverter, BOS) stem from its 
historical involvement in PV deployment through 
an original mix of public policies and private 
sector (secured) investment. Current leadership 
in BOS and know-how concerning value-added 
technologies and services (installations) would 
not have been possible without proactive supply 
chain public policies over the last 20 years in key 
EU member countries.
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In a hypercompetitive environment in any of the 
value chain segments, from upstream innovation 
to BOS equipment provision, the emergence of 
new competitors such as China – publicised by the 
media because of its rapid and spectacular domi-
nation of almost half of a specific technology mar-
ket (crystalline-silicon cells and modules) – has not 
occurred at EU expense so far. On the contrary, the 
sharp reduction in module prices caused by Chi-
na’s leadership in c-Si helped to narrow the gap in 
EU markets between PV electricity prices and grid 
parity. This catching up process occurred through 
classical price competition in non-innovative tech-
nology segments of the value chain. 
The hypercompetition we observe in the PV 
supply chain describes much more accurately in-
novation and innovation deployment in second 
and third generation cells, where Chinese firms 
are not the main competitors. Risky technologies 
where no mass production (and related economies 
of scale profits) can be envisaged so far are areas 
where competition is harsh, but emerging country 
firms, and particularly Chinese ones, are not yet 
leaders. Hypercompetition means that there is no 
sustainable leadership or captive market to rely 
on. Yet with growing renewables (and PV) markets 
worldwide, any new technology is likely to find its 
way to the market in the near future (see the case 
of CPV, where France is positioning itself as a – 
temporary – leader). 
The challenge for the EU is to consolidate its 
strengths (particularly on thin films and CPV) and 
to address its protracted weaknesses. Overall po-
litical support for PV in the EU is weak, because 
of limited knowledge on this issue among policy 
makers, risk averse behaviour towards an alleg-
edly costly technology (when compared to other 
renewables), the lack of a comprehensive vision at 
EU level of R&D requirements and industrial needs 
and, finally, the fallacy of EU firms being doomed 
to fail because of low-cost competitors worldwide. 
Mass production for decades-old technologies is 
no longer conceivable in Europe; this is true for 
monocrystalline silicon cells as much as for any 
low-cost, low-value added technology. Education 
and information are greatly needed in this respect. 
A serious concern could be asymmetrical gains 
from trade and unfair (hyper)competition. The 
fact that hypercompetition occurs mainly among 
OECD firms for high-value added, high-tech seg-
ments somehow creates a level playing field in 
terms of cost structures and R&D policy frame-
works today. One problem could be that in ex-
change for importing low-cost cells and modules 
from other countries, EU firms would be unable 
to access such countries’ domestic markets in a 
reciprocal manner. Local content requirement, 
restricted tender to national firms, export-driven 
public subsidies and technical barriers to trade 
are more serious concerns than price reduction in 
conventional PV technologies. Hastening China’s 
signature of the WTO plurilateral Agreement on 
Government Procurement (GPA) would help to 
address such concerns. 
5.  coNclusioN
In its 2005 Communication on the support of 
electricity from renewable energy sources, the 
European Commission asserted that “the renew-
able energy sector has a decentralised structure, 
which leads to employment in the less industrialised 
areas as well. Unlike other jobs, these jobs cannot be 
“globalised” to the same extent. Even if a country 
were to import 100% of its renewable energy tech-
nology, a significant number of jobs would be created 
locally for the sale, installation and maintenance of 
the systems”.
The first finding of this study is that the EC as-
sertion is confirmed by the empirical data collect-
ed. In the two renewable value chains examined, 
figure 11. PV value chain, 2010 and 2020
Source: European Photovoltaic Industry Association unpublished data.
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the majority of value added and jobs are located 
within the EU, with so far limited entry from for-
eign firms into significant segments of the chains. 
EU workers and consumers have enjoyed the ben-
efits of the historical involvement of some key EU 
firms and countries in the research, development 
and deployment of innovative wind and PV tech-
nologies. The original mix of public incentives, 
regulations, subsidies and risk-taking behaviour 
of private companies all result in clear EU leader-
ship of the wind energy sector in most of the global 
value chain segments, and the majority of business 
opportunities created worldwide benefiting EU PV 
firms (BOS, inverter, installation).
Ongoing changes in the respective wind and PV 
supply chains illustrate two narratives of globali-
sation. In conventional competition, where early-
mover firms gain an advantage over competitors 
through innovation and economies of scale in 
an oligopoly market structure, EU firms involved 
in the wind energy supply chain operate as sus-
tainable leaders, gaining and sustaining an edge 
through their experience curve and captive mar-
ket shares. This is also the case for foreign firms 
operating on old and mature technologies (mass 
production with increasing returns to scale in 
low-tech mono crystalline silicon by China, for in-
stance). In the second narrative of globalisation, 
hypercompetition does not isolate sustainable 
leaders protected by captive markets, trade secrets 
or patents and economies of scale. Rapid shifts can 
occur in the production process at various (and 
increasing numbers of) stages across firms and 
countries depending on the marginal cost of rapid-
ly evolving technology. Even though hypercompe-
tition unfolding in the PV value chain is currently 
beneficial to EU firms and jobs (particularly in thin 
film, third generation PV and inverters), it does 
not lead to clear and sustainable EU leadership as 
in the case of wind energy. In this respect, the PV 
industry seems more fragile and policy-dependent 
than the wind energy sector. 
Contrary to the “threat” allegedly posed by 
China entering conventional competition (cost 
advantage) on mc-Si, low-cost imported PV cells 
and modules seem more likely to have had a posi-
tive impact on the EU PV value chain, with a boom 
in PV installed capacities (leading to downstream 
value added and jobs) and the indirect incentive 
for EU firms to enter the market with alternative 
technologies. Declining costs of PV cells and mod-
ules should lead to a rising share of value added 
captured by downstream activities, whose costs 
are predictably stable in the EU and related non-
tradable jobs worldwide. More and more value 
added (and related jobs) should therefore be cre-
ated in Europe in the PV sector. 
Even though the current competition structure 
in wind and PV energy value chains is beneficial 
to EU firms, this situation might not be stable over 
time. Hypercompetition could become the domi-
nant narrative in the wind value chain (offshore) 
along with a progressive worldwide shift towards 
renewables, while barriers to entry in emerging 
(and booming) captive markets such as China 
could mean hypercompetition in the PV sector, 
which could turn oligopolistic and conventional, to 
the detriment of EU firms prevented from access-
ing such markets. In both cases, public policies are 
at stake; in the EU, through sustained incentives 
(price policy, technology deployment, public policy 
predictability and stability) and globally, by level-
ling the playing field in export competition and 
government procurement through negotiated (and 
updated) multilateral agreements in these two key 
and rather weak areas of global trade governance. ❚
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annex 2. Major OEMs1 per region
onshore offshore
Europe
Enercon (EU)
Vestas (EU)
Gamesa (EU)
Nordex (EU)
Siemens (EU)
GE (US)
Acciona (EU)
Fuhrländer (EU)
Siemens (EU)
Vestas (EU)
Both: 95% of the market in 2010 (MW installed).
GE Wind (US)
Nordex (EU)
RePower (EU)123
Alstom Power (EU)
Areva Wind (EU)
WinWind (EU)4
Bard (EU)
North America
GE Wind (US)
Vestas (EU)
Gamesa (EU)
Siemens (EU)
None
Latin America
Africa
Enercon (EU)
Vestas (EU)
Gamesa (EU)
Suzlon (IN)
None
Asia-Pacific
Sinovel (CH)
Goldwind (CH)
Dongfang (CH)
United Power (CH)
Suzlon (IN)
Sinovel (CH)
Goldwind (CH)
Suzlon (IN)
Source: European Wind Energy Association and interviews.
1. Original equipment manufacturers (OEM).
Source: BTM Consult. Note that figures may differ between sources.
appeNdiX
annex 1. Top 10 wind turbine manufacturers by annual market share in 2010
1. Danemark Vestas 14.8% 6. Inde Suzlon Group 6.9% (including Suzlon Energy (IN) and RePower (DE)
2. Chine Sinovel 11.1% 7.Chine Dongfang Electric 6.7%
3. États-Unis GE Wind Energy 9.6% 8. Espagne Gamesa 6.6%
4. Chine Goldwind 9.5% 9. Danemark/Allemagne Siemens Wind Power 5.9%
5. Allemagne Enercon 7.2% 10. Chine United Power 4.2%
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annex 3. Typical wind energy job profiles required by different types of industries
company type field of activity main job profiles
Wind energy 
manufacturers
Wind turbine producers, 
including manufacturers of 
major sub-components and 
assembly factories.
Highly qualified chemical, electrical, mechanical & materials engineers dealing with 
R&D issues, product design, management and quality control of production process.
Semi-skilled and non-skilled workers for the production chains.
Health and safety experts.
Technical staff for the O&M and repair of the wind turbines.
Other supporting staff (including administrative, sales managers, marketing and 
accounting).
Developers
Management of all the tasks 
related to the development 
of wind farms (planning, 
permits, construction etc.).
Project managers (engineers, economists) to coordinate the process.
Environmental engineers and other specialists to analyse the environmental impacts of 
wind farms.
Programmers and meteorologists for wind energy forecasts and prediction models.
Lawyers and economists to deal with the legal and financial aspects of project 
development.
Other supporting staff (including administrative, sales managers, marketing and 
accounting).
Construction, repair and 
O&M
Construction of the wind farm, 
regular inspection and repair 
activities.
Technical staff for the O&M and repair of wind turbines.
Electrical and civil engineers for the coordination of construction works.
Health and safety experts.
Specialists in the transport of heavy goods.
Electricians.
Technical staff specialised in wind turbine installation, including activities in cranes, 
fitters and nacelles.
Semi-skilled and non-skilled workers for the construction process.
Other supporting staff (including administrative, sales managers and accounting).
Independent power 
producers, utilities
Operation of the wind farm 
and sale of the electricity 
produced.
Electrical, environmental and civil engineers for the management of plants.
Technical staff for the O&M of plants, if this task is not sub-contracted.
Health and safety experts.
Financiers, sales and marketing staff to deal with the sale of electricity.
Other supporting staff (including administrative and accounting).
Consultancies, legal 
entities, engineering, 
financial institutions, 
insurers, R&D centres, 
others.
Diverse specialised activities 
linked to the wind energy 
business.
Programmers and meteorologists for the analysis of wind regimes and output forecasts.
Engineers specialised in aerodynamics, computational fluid dynamics and other R&D 
areas.
Environmental engineers.
Energy policy experts.
Experts in social surveys, training and communication.
Financiers and economists.
Lawyers specialised in energy and environmental matters.
Marketing personnel, event organisers.
Source: European Wind Energy Association and authors
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annex 4. Wind turbine components and raw materials used
Wind turbine component raw materials used Weight ratio/mW installed
Foundation (tower) Concrete 76-77%
Foundation, tower, nacelle, rotor, gearBox, 
transformer, generator
Steel, steel plate, cast iron
19-21%
Cabling, rotor, nacelle Aluminium
1-3%Cabling, nacelle, generator, transformer Copper
Electronics Lead
Cast components (e.g. hub) Nickel
Blades
Epoxy/polyester resins
1-2%Glass fibre
Carbon fibre
Balsa wood
Foam
Source: Authors.
annex 7. Investment costs (%)
Onshore Offshore
Turbine 70% 30-50%
Foundation 5-7% 15-25%
Installation 1-9% 1-30%
Grid connection 8-10% 15-30%
Property/Land 
rent
2-4% -
Infrastructure 1-5% -
Other - 8%
Total € 1100-1200/kW € 2800-3000/kW
Source: European Wind Energy Association.
annex 5. Material requirements per MW 
installed
material t/mW
Concrete 549
Stainless steel 125/142
Iron/cast iron 14
Glass fibre 8
Epoxy resin 6
Carbon fibre 2
Copper 1
Aluminium 1
Nickel <0.2
Balsa <0.01
Source: Authors.
annex 6. Cost structure of a typical 2 MW 
wind turbine installed in Europe (2006)/
onshore
iNmeNt € %
Turbine (ex works) 928 75.6
Grid connection 109 8.9
Foundation 80 6.5
Land rent 48 3.9
Electric installation 18 1.5
Consultancy 15 1.2
Financial costs 15 1.2
Road construction 11 0.9
Control system 4 0.3
Note: Calculated by the author based on selected data for European wind turbine 
installations.
Source: European Wind Energy Association.
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annex 8. PV system description
The key parts of a solar energy generation system 
are:
 m Photovoltaic modules to collect sunlight;
 m An inverter to transform direct current (DC) 
into alternating current (AC);
 m A set of batteries for stand-alone PV systems;
 m Support structures to turn the PV modules to-
wards the Sun.
The system components, excluding the PV mod-
ules, are referred to as the balance of system (BOS) 
components.
PV cells and modules
The solar cell is the basic unit of a PV system. PV 
cells are generally made from either:
 m crystalline silicon, sliced from ingots or castings;
 m grown ribbons;
 m alternative semiconductor materials deposited 
in thin layers on a low-cost backing (thin film).
Cells are connected to form larger units called 
modules. Thin sheets of EVA or PVB (resin type) 
are used to bind cells together and to provide 
weather protection. The modules are normally en-
closed between a transparent cover (usually glass) 
and a weatherproof backing sheet (typically made 
from a thin polymer). Modules can be framed for 
extra mechanical strength and durability. Thin 
film modules are usually encapsulated between 
two sheets of glass, so a frame is not needed.
Modules can be connected to each other in se-
ries (known as an array) to increase the total volt-
age produced by the system. The arrays are con-
nected in parallel to increase the system current. 
The power generated by PV modules varies from 
a few watts (typically 20 to 60 Wp) up to 300 to 
350 Wp depending on module size and the tech-
nology used. Low wattage modules are typically 
used for stand-alone applications where power 
demand is generally low. Standard crystalline sili-
con modules contain about 60 to 72 solar cells and 
have a nominal power ranging from 120 to 300 Wp 
depending on size and efficiency. Standard thin 
film modules have lower nominal power (60 to 120 
Wp) and their size is generally smaller. Modules 
can be sized according to the site where they will 
be placed and installed quickly. They are robust, 
reliable and weatherproof. Module producers usu-
ally guarantee a power output of 80% of the Wp, 
even after 20 to 25 years of use. Module lifetime is 
typically considered to be 25 years, although it can 
easily exceed 30 years.
annex 9. PV technologies
PV technologies are classified as first, second or 
third generation. First generation technology is 
the basic crystalline silicon (c-Si). Second genera-
tion includes thin film technologies, while third 
generation includes concentrator photovoltaics, 
organics, and other technologies that have not yet 
been commercialised on a large scale.
Crystalline silicon technology
Crystalline silicon cells are made from thin slices 
(wafers) cut from a single crystal or a block of 
silicon. The type of crystalline cell produced 
depends on how the wafers are made. The main 
types of crystalline cells are:
 m Monocrystalline (mc-Si);
 m Polycrystalline or multicrystalline (pc-Si);
 m Ribbon and sheet-defined film growth (ribbon/
sheet c-Si).
The single crystal method provides higher ef-
ficiency, and therefore higher power generation. 
Crystalline silicon is the most common and mature 
technology, representing about 85% of the market 
today. Cells turn between 14 and 22% of the sun-
light that reaches them into electricity. For c-Si 
modules, efficiency ranges between 12 and 19%. 
Individual solar cells range from 1 to 15 cm across 
(0.4 to 6 inches). However, the most common cells 
are 12.7 x 12.7 cm (5 x 5 inches) or 15 x 15 cm (6 x 
6 inches) and produce 3 to 4.5 W – a very small 
amount of power. A standard c-Si module is made 
up of about 60 to 72 solar cells and has a nominal 
power ranging from 120 to 300 Wp depending on 
size and efficiency. The typical module size is 1.4 to 
1.7 m² although larger modules are also manufac-
tured (up to 2.5 m²). These are typically used for 
building integrated PV applications.
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Thin films
Thin film modules are made by depositing 
extremely thin layers of photosensitive material 
onto to a low-cost backing such as glass, stain-
less steel or plastic. Once the deposited mate-
rial is attached to the backing, it is laser-cut into 
multiple thin cells. Thin film modules are normally 
enclosed between two layers of glass and are 
frameless. If the photosensitive material has been 
deposited on a thin plastic film, the module is flex-
ible. This creates opportunities to integrate solar 
power generation into the fabric of a building or 
end-consumer applications.
Four types of thin film modules are commercially 
available:
1. Amorphous silicon (a-Si)
The semiconductor layer is only about 1 μm thick. 
Amorphous silicon can absorb more sunlight than 
c-Si structures. However, a lower flow of electrons 
is generated, which leads to very large substrates 
(up to 5.7 m² on glass), reducing in turn manufac-
turing costs. An increasing number of companies 
are developing light, flexible a-Si modules that are 
perfectly suiTable for flat and curved industrial 
roofs.
2. Multi-junction thin silicon film (a-Si/μc-Si)
This consists of an a-Si cell with additional layers 
of a-Si and micro-crystalline silicon (μc-Si)
applied to the substrate. The μc-Si layer absorbs 
more light from the red and near-infrared part of 
the light spectrum. This increases efficiency by up 
to 10%. The thickness of the μc-Si layer is in the or-
der of 3 μm, making the cells thicker but also more 
stable. The current maximum substrate size for 
this technology is 1.4 m², which avoids instability.
3. Cadmium telluride (CdTe)
CdTe thin films cost less to manufacture and have 
a module efficiency of up to 11%. This makes it the 
most economical thin film technology currently 
available. The two main raw materials are 
cadmium and tellurium. Cadmium is a by-product 
of zinc mining. Tellurium is a by-product of copper 
processing. It is produced in far lower quantities 
than cadmium. Availability in the long-term may 
depend on whether the copper industry can opti-
mise extraction, refining and recycling yields.
4. Copper, indium, gallium, (di)selenide/ (di)
sulphide (CIGS) and copper, indium, (di)
selenide/(di)sulphide (CIS)
CIGS and CIS offer the highest efficiencies of all 
thin film technologies. Efficiencies of 20% have 
been achieved in the laboratory, close to the 
levels achieved with c-Si cells. The manufacturing 
process is more complex and less standardised 
than for other types of cells.
This tends to increase manufacturing costs. 
Current module efficiencies are in the range of 7 
to 12%. There are no long-term availability issues 
for selenium and gallium. Indium is available in 
limited quantities but there are no signs of a forth-
coming shortage. While there is a lot of indium in 
tin and tungsten ores, extracting it could drive the 
prices higher. A number of industries compete for 
indium resources: the liquid crystal display (LCD) 
industry currently accounts for 85% of demand. It 
is highly likely that indium prices will remain high 
in the coming years. Typical module power rang-
es from 60 to 350 W depending on the substrate 
size and efficiency. There is no common industry 
agreement on optimal module size for thin film 
technologies. As a result, they vary from 0.6 to 1.0 
m² for CIGS and CdTe, and from 1.4 to 5.7 m² for 
silicon-based thin films. Very large modules are of 
great interest to the building sector as they offer 
efficiencies in terms of handling and price.
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annex 10. PV – region, total shipments, leading firms and shipments
regioN total shipmeNts (mWp) leadiNg firms their shipmeNts
Europe 397 Q-cells 128
Schott Solar 63
+ 8 other firms
Japan 635 Sharp 292
Kyocera 109
Mitsubishi 77
Snayo 96
+ 1 other firm
United States 119 7 firms
China 116 Suntech Power 63
+ 2 other firms: Hingbo 
Solar Cell and Shenzhen 
Topray
Rest of world 133 4 firms, including 2 
developing nations firms: 
Motech (Taiwan) and BP 
Solar (India)
Source: Greenpeace and European Photovoltaic Industry Association, Solar Generation (April 2006).
annex 11. Direct and indirect occupations 
in the PV industry
Direct occupations
Jobs created in the production, installation and 
maintenance of PV projects, solar silicon, ingots 
and wafer producers: 
 m Solar cell and module producers
 m Photovoltaic equipment producers
 m Balance of systems producers and suppliers
 m System integrators and assemblers
 m Suppliers and distributors
 m Installers 
 m Service and repair technicians (operations, 
maintenance and demounting)
 m Site surveyors and assessors
 m Managers and entrepreneurs
 m Sales representatives, marketers and estimators
 m Engineers
 m Project developers
 m Designers
 m Researchers and scientists
 m Trainers and educators
Indirect occupations 
Jobs created in the production of all inputs into the 
photovoltaic industry on all intermediate levels of 
production:
 m Architects and planners
 m Builders
 m Commodity suppliers, chemical industry, ma-
chinery industry, glass industry, electronic de-
vice producers, plastics and polymer industries, 
equipment suppliers, wire and cable makers, 
and steel, aluminium, copper, and other metal 
industries
 m Trade and skilled labourers, roofers, electri-
cians, heating, ventilation, and air conditioning 
installers
 m Energy exchange pool, energy authorities and 
electric power utility employees
 m Financers and investors
 m Media and publishers
 m Policy and programme managers
 m Employees in local and regional municipalities 
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The Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations (IDDRI) is a Paris and Brussels based non-profit policy research institute. Its objective is to develop and share key knowledge and tools for analysing and shedding light on the strategic issues of sustainable development from a global perspective.
Given the rising stakes of the issues posed by climate change and biodiversity loss, 
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and also participates in work on reframing development pathways. A special 
effort has been made to develop a partnership network with emerging countries 
to better understand and share various perspectives on sustainable development 
issues and governance.
For more effective action, IDDRI operates with a network of partners from 
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France and Europe but also internationally. As an independent policy research 
institute, IDDRI mobilises resources and expertise to disseminate the most 
relevant scientific ideas and research ahead of negotiations and decision-making 
processes. It applies a crosscutting approach to its work, which focuses on five 
threads: global governance, climate change, biodiversity, urban fabric, and 
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